Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law by Boardman, Michelle
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 3
2013
Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law
Michelle Boardman
0@0.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 305 (2013) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol40/iss2/3
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
PENALTY DEFAULT RULES IN INSURANCE LAW 
 
Michelle Boardman
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law, 40 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 305 (2013).  
PENALTY DEFAULT RULES IN INSURANCE LAW 
MICHELLE BOARDMAN?
ABSTRACT
 A default rule tells a court how to fill a gap in a contract. A penalty default rule tells a 
court to fill the gap in a way that is undesirable to at least one of the parties. The threat of a 
penalty default rule is meant to induce parties to reveal information, to each other or the 
courts, by contracting around the penalty. Since the concept was first introduced by Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner in Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1990), major scholars have argued over which rules, if any,  
might qualify. 
 A prime candidate has been nominated but never elected. Contra proferentem, the doc-
trine that ambiguities in a contract should be construed against the drafter, is repeatedly 
mentioned as a likely penalty default, including in the original Ayres & Gertner article and 
in a major critique by Eric Posner in 2006. Surprisingly, despite the shared intuition that 
contra proferentem is a penalty default rule, this Article is the first to seriously take it on.  
 Insurance contra proferentem provides an unusual test case because it is actively con-
ceived of by many courts as punitive, aimed at producing more information in the form of a 
redrafted contract clause. If contra proferentem is not a penalty default, prospects look dim 
for the rule’s existence. The doctrine is predominately applied in the insurance context, and I 
am the first insurance scholar to fully take the field.  
 By scrutinizing the candidate, this Article makes two contributions. To the study of con-
tractual gaps, it proves there is at least one penalty default rule in the world, but one that 
does not operate in either of the two ways the existing literature envisions. This new category 
sharpens our understanding of the remaining defaults. To the interpretation of consumer 
contracts, and insurance contracts in particular, this Article sounds a warning about the 
dangers of penalty default rules. Contra proferentem operates as a regrettable penalty de-
fault and for reasons that hold for consumer contracts more broadly. In short, the rule does 
not consistently force the sophisticated party to better inform the consumer, but it does exact 
consumer cost. In a non-trivial subset of cases, the rule widens the misunderstanding be-
tween contract drafter and consumer. 
 There is a fundamental difficulty with information-forcing rules in insurance, at least to 
the extent the information is meant to be revealed to the policyholder and not the courts: the 
less informed party is tough to inform. In addition, the incentive to inform—the incentive to 
escape the penalty—is anemic when applied unilaterally to a class of drafters who can be 
indifferent to a penalty as long as (1) it applies to its competitors equally and (2) the costs of 
the penalty are ultimately paid by the buyer.  
 In short, the nature of insurance interpretation makes contra proferentem an excellent 
candidate for a penalty default rule descriptively and a poor candidate for the rule nor-
matively. Parallel problems can be expected if a penalty default is applied to boilerplate  
consumer contracts.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
 The exploration of penalty default rules in contract law began 
twenty years ago.1 It became a debate in 2006 when Eric Posner de-
clared that the prior twenty or so articles had been discussing a null 
set.2 A default rule tells a court how to fill a gap in a contract. A pen-
alty default tells a court to fill the gap in a way that is undesirable to 
at least one of the parties, in the hopes of getting the parties to con-
tract around the penalty. Much of the best thought has been focused 
on whether Hadley v. Baxendale,3 the seminal example of a penalty 
default rule, does indeed contain a penalty default.4 That is not the 
question asked here.  
 There is a more promising candidate for a penalty default in the 
real world: the contra proferentem doctrine that ambiguities in a con-
                                                                                                                    
 1. For starting the whole affair, one can thank Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 
(1990). One precursor to their work was LON L. FULLER & ROBERT BRAUCHER, BASIC CON-
TRACT LAW 557-58 (Erwin N. Griswold ed., 1964).  
 2. See Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2006). Posner called the penalty default rule “a theoretical curiosity 
that has no existence in contract doctrine.” Id. at 563. Well more than twenty articles men-
tioned the concept of penalty defaults by 2006, but the author’s WestLaw search revealed 
that approximately twenty took the subject as a central topic.  
 3. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
 4. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven 
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Had-
ley v. Baxendale, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 563 (1992); George S. Geis, Empirically Assessing Had-
ley v. Baxendale, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 897 (2005); Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy 
Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008).  
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tract should be construed against the drafter. By scrutinizing the 
candidate, this Article makes two contributions. To the study of con-
tractual gaps, it proves there is at least one penalty default rule in 
the world, but one that does not operate in either of the two ways the 
existing literature envisions. This new category sharpens our under-
standing of the remaining defaults.  
 To the interpretation of consumer contracts, and insurance con-
tracts in particular, this Article sounds a warning about the dangers 
of penalty default rules. Contra proferentem is “[t]he most frequently 
employed principle of interpretation” in insurance cases.5 It operates 
as a regrettable penalty default and for reasons that hold for con-
sumer contracts more broadly. In short, the rule does not consistently 
force the sophisticated party to better inform the consumer, but it does 
exact costs on consumers. In a non-trivial subset of cases, the rule wid-
ens the misunderstanding between contract drafter and consumer. 
 The taxonomy of penalty default rules is organized around two 
dichotomies: (1) default rules versus mandatory or immutable rules, 
and (2) majoritarian rules versus penalty default rules.6 An immuta-
ble rule is simply a rule the parties cannot contract around.7 A de-
fault rule is a background rule that fills a gap in a contract; it is a 
rule the parties can contract around by filling the gap with their own 
term.8 Courts may set a default rule by attempting to determine what 
the parties would have agreed to ex ante, had they come to agreement.9
This is the so-called majoritarian default rule.10 Price is an example 
under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.): if the parties fail to 
set one, the price is the “reasonable price at the time for delivery.”11
 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, in their seminal work, proposed a 
contrary category in which the default is set counter to what the par-
ties would have agreed.12 The threat of these penalty default rules is 
meant to induce parties to reveal information, to each other or the 
courts, by contracting around the penalty.13 Thus, these rules are also 
                                                                                                                    
 5. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 37 (5th ed. 2010). 
 6. The other counterpart to majoritarian rules is minoritarian rules. See Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999). 
 7. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 87. 
 8. Id.
 9. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel wrote the original work advocating corporate 
law default rules. “The gap-filling rule will call on courts to duplicate the terms the parties 
would have selected, in their joint interest, if they had contracted explicitly.” Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1433 (1989). 
 10. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 93. 
 11. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2012). 
 12. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 91. 
 13. Id.
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called information-forcing defaults.14 (Less relevant here, a rule can 
be minoritarian without a punitive motivation.)15
 Is contra proferentem a penalty default or information-forcing 
rule? If so, then penalty default rules exist. More important than 
having a dog in that fight, the analytical framework set up by the 
theory provides a new way to evaluate the efficiency of penalty de-
faults rules in consumer contracts. The primary candidate—contra 
proferentem—has been nominated but never elected. Freed from the 
insurance context, it is mentioned as a possible penalty default in a 
footnote in the original Ayres and Gertner article.16 It is assumed to 
be a penalty default rule example in a few other pieces.17 Both Posner 
and Ayres, in later pieces, momentarily consider whether insurance 
contra proferentem is a penalty default rule.18 Surprisingly, despite 
the shared intuition that contra proferentem is a penalty default 
rule, this Article is the first to fully take it on.19
 For those interested in the penalty dog fight, insurance contra 
proferentem provides an unusual test case because it is actively con-
ceived of by many courts as punitive, aimed at producing more in-
formation in the form of a redrafted contract clause. One may differ 
as to whether a true penalty default rule needs to be recognized as 
such by the courts applying it. But if contra proferentem is not a pen-
alty default, prospects look dim for the rule’s existence. It is not sur-
prising that of the nine or so court cases to directly cite to the Ayres 
and Gertner gap-filling concept, one-third are insurance cases.20
                                                                                                                    
 14. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1593. 
 15. See id. at 1593. 
 16. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 105 n.80 (“[T]he common-law doctrine of con-
struing ambiguities in contracts against the drafter can be viewed as a penalty default. 
The doctrine is not based on the judgment that the parties would have wanted the anti-
drafter provision, but that such a penalty encourages drafters to draft more precise contracts.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 17. See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incom-
plete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 391 [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree];
William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 823, 863 (2004); Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis 
for Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1840-41 (2004) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, 
Contracts Without Consent].
 18. See Posner, supra note 2, at 578-80, 582-85, 587; Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are 
and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 596-99 (2006).  
 19. The best treatments to date have been fairly brief and not the central thesis of the 
work. In addition to Eric Posner’s excellent critique concluding that contra proferentem is 
not a penalty default, supra note 2, at 578-80, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity 
in Property and Liability Insurance, 36 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 777, 779-80 (2001), 
accepting contra proferentem as a rule of interpretation that serves as a penalty default. 
Id. at 779-80. His contribution to default rules in insurance is in his analysis of the efficient 
lack of cost-reducing defaults in insurance. See id.   
 20. See infra Part I.B. Insurance cases: See City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., 332 F.3d 38, 49, 49 n.10 (2d Cir. 2003) (insurance case considering both fortuity and 
contra proferentem as possible penalty defaults); Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenealy, 72 
F.3d 264, 269 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 976 
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 For those interested in the insurance fight, the patchy and unpre-
dictable application of contra proferentem stems in part from uncer-
tainty over how the rule should operate. Contra proferentem in in-
surance is an inscrutable but ubiquitous doctrine.21 This is an unfor-
tunate combination. Understanding whether the rule is a penalty 
default, and whether it should be, would resolve many disputes. This
Article also aims to clear up some confusion caused by the fact that 
one interpretive rule, going under one name, may be applied at dif-
ferent times as a penalty default, majoritarian, or mandatory rule. 
 Part I first sets out the gaps to be filled in insurance contracts and 
then proves that contra proferentem is a penalty default rule, despite 
some oddities. Part II asks whether contra proferentem should be a 
penalty default. In Part II.A, I establish that contra proferentem fails 
to have the desired effect on either insurers or consumers; it is inef-
fective. In Part II.B, I make the case that any benefits of contra 
proferentem are overwhelmed by its costs; it is inefficient. Finally, 
Part III envisions alternative forms of contra proferentem that fare 
better—a non-penalty majoritarian version and a penalty version 
aimed at courts, not consumers.  
 There is a fundamental difficulty with information-forcing rules in 
insurance, at least to the extent the information is meant to be re-
vealed to the policyholder and not the courts: the less informed party 
is tough to inform.22 In addition, the incentive to inform—the incen-
tive to escape the penalty—is anemic when applied unilaterally to a 
class of drafters who can be indifferent to a penalty as long as (1) it 
applies to its competitors equally and (2) the costs of the penalty are 
ultimately paid by the buyer.
 In short, the nature of insurance interpretation makes contra 
proferentem and related doctrines excellent candidates for a penalty 
default rule descriptively and poor candidates for the rules norma-
tively. Parallel problems can be expected if a penalty default is ap-
plied to boilerplate consumer contracts.  
                                                                                                                    
(7th Cir. 1991). Non-insurance cases: See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 248-49 
(1995) (contract class action case); Moreau v. Harris Cnty., 158 F.3d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 
1998) (class action case under Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v. Westlands Wa-
ter Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (water reclamation fee case); Coronet 
Ins. Co. v. GACC Holding Co., No. 90 C 07189, 1991 WL 172182, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 
1991) (unreported breach of financial instrument case); In re Premier Entm’t Biloxi LLC, 
445 B.R. 582, 627 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2010) (bankruptcy case); Concord Real Estate CDO 
2006-1, Ltd. v. Bank of Am. N.A., 996 A.2d 324, 332 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2010) (debt case). 
 21. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COV-
ERAGE DISPUTES § 1.03[b], at 14-19 (10th ed. 1998). 
 22. See Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense,
95 IOWA L. REV. 1075 (2010). 
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II. IS CONTRA PROFERENTEM A PENALTY DEFAULT RULE?
A.   The “Gaps” in Insurance: The Holes to Be Filled 
 Central to the question of penalty default rules is the meaning of 
“gap.” Because insurance gaps tend to differ from a simple missing 
term, we must first investigate the hole to be filled. Default terms are 
meant to fill gaps, not substitute for present terms. If a contract is 
silent where a term could or should speak, there is a gap to be filled. 
Insurance contracts rarely have such stark gaps, at least on the 
much-litigated terms of coverage. This is because the structure of the 
contracts provides an inherent default answer to coverage questions.  
 An insurance contract contains an initial grant of coverage fol-
lowed by multiple exclusions carving out risks that are returned to 
the policyholder.23 (Smaller pockets of risk are then volleyed back to 
the insurer by exceptions to the exclusions.) Given this structure, 
there tends to be a term addressing whether a particular loss is cov-
ered. If it is not in the initial grant of coverage, it is explicitly not 
covered. If it is in the grant of coverage, it is covered unless there is 
an exclusion on point.24
 The policies are often so comprehensive that even when a new risk 
arises in the world there is language in the policy that seems on 
point, suggesting coverage or exclusion.25 For example, when policy-
holders first brought claims for the destruction of valuable electronic
data, courts struggled with whether electronically stored data is 
“tangible property” and whether the loss of data is “property dam-
age.”26 Note that while some courts labeled the data “tangible property” 
and some declined, none were flummoxed by the lack of an “electronic 
data clause”; instead, courts assumed that there were instructions to 
be followed in the existing policy language. 27 The contract remained 
                                                                                                                    
 23. These are generalizations about a mythical abstract insurance contract, but de-
fensible generalizations. An unusually clear treatment of the organization of insurance 
policies can be found at EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW § 2.11 (Rev. 3d ed. 2006). 
 24. Insurance policies contain terms that are not coverage terms, of course. Notice 
requirements, amounts of coverage, and the right and duty to defend, for example, are also 
likely to cover the relevant ground without leaving gaps. 
 25. “Insurance law has had little need to generate cost-reducing default rules, because 
the insurance industry has already done so through the development of standard-form 
policy provisions.” Abraham, supra note 19, at 779.  
 26. For a thorough analysis of the options under different policies and clauses, see 
Robert H. Jerry, II & Michele L. Mekel, Cybercoverage for Cyber-Risks: An Overview of 
Insurers’ Responses to the Perils of E-Commerce, 8 CONN. L.J. 7 (2001). For two of the best 
opinions on each side, compare America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 347 
F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding under Virginia law, computer data not covered because not 
tangible property), with Centennial Insurance Co. v. Applied Health Care Systems, Inc.,
710 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding under California law, insurer had a duty to defend a 
computer hardware and software policyholder for loss of computer data).  
 27. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc., 347 F.3d at 99; Centennial Ins. Co., 710 F.2d at 1290-91. 
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incomplete in the sense that the parties had no intent on the new is-
sue, but the contract could be construed without intent as opposed to 
the court throwing up its hands and refusing to issue a ruling.  
 Thus, the insurance contract is rarely “incomplete” and hence not 
an initial target of Ayres and Gertner’s original work.28 But a gap can 
also be a gap in application caused by an underspecified term.29
While insurance contracts might not have blanks where a term 
should be, they can have gibberish where a term should be. Or they 
might have two equally plausible but mutually exclusive terms where 
one term should be. This gibberish or Cerberus creates a cavity in the 
contract where a term should be. This is the gap courts seek to fill.30
 Courts may be engaged in more than gap filling, of course. Insur-
ers often do not admit to a gap, naturally, and instead describe the 
court as having chosen not a default but a substitute. In some cir-
cumstances the substitute appears to be mandatory.31 Or a gap filler 
may be on the borderline between default and mandatory; the rule is 
held out as a default, but contracting around it is extremely difficult 
or, at times, impossible.32 This Article aims to clear up some confu-
sion caused by the fact that one interpretive rule, going under one 
                                                                                                                       
 28. Ayres and Gertner are open to penalty defaults where a contract is indefinite ra-
ther than having a gap caused by an absent term. They conceive of the common law rule 
against enforcing contracts that are too indefinite as a penalty default, for example. See Ayres 
& Gertner, supra note 1, at 97 (using as an example “the common law's broader rule that ‘for 
a contract to be binding the terms of the contract must be reasonably certain and definite’ ” 
(quoting Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch., 354 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976))); id. at 106 
(discussing Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957)). 
 29. Ayres and Gertner identify two types of “incompleteness.” Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 1, at 92. In the first type, the contract does not set the “duties for specific future con-
tingencies,” and in the second type the contract sets forth full duties but the duties do not 
vary with “relevant future contingencies.” See id. at 92 n.29. Both of these failures could 
arise from a missing term or from an indefinite term.  
 30. While denying the existence of penalty default rules, Eric Posner agrees that some 
gaps are the result of ambiguity. See Posner, supra note 2, at 568-69.  
 31. A possible mandatory default in some jurisdictions is a certain amount of coverage 
for commercial pollution. After insurers redrafted older pollution exclusions to add that 
only “sudden and accidental” pollution would be covered, more than one court held that 
“sudden” does not include a temporal element. See Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, 
Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclu-
sion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610, 618, 618 n.24 (1990). Given that “sudden” refers to time, if it 
refers to anything, these cases are best read as simply denying insurers the scope of exclu-
sion they wanted. For the full history, see generally Ballard & Manus, supra, and Timothy 
M. Gebhart, A “Timeless” Interpretation of the “Sudden and Accidental” Exception to the 
Pollution Exclusion?, 41 S.D. L. REV. 314 (1996). 
 32. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 123. In discussing the famous Peevyhouse v. 
Garland Coal & Mining Co. case, Ayres and Gertner state that “[e]ither the majority opinion 
is 1) disingenuously creating an immutable rule; or 2) creating a ‘strong’ default rule” that 
Peevyhouse did not overcome despite contract language to the contrary. Id. at 122 (discussing 
Peevyhouse’s use of diminution-in-value as the damages default for construction breach). 
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name, may be applied at different times as a penalty default, majori-
tarian, or mandatory rule.33
B.   The Source of the Gap 
 The source of the gap can indicate how it should be addressed. Of 
the two often-named sources of incompleteness—the cost of contract-
ing and strategic incompleteness34—neither is an obvious fit for in-
surance. While cost must constrain insurers at the margin, proper-
ty/casualty insurers often draft policies through the industry-wide 
organization, the Insurance Services Office, spending large amounts 
of money and time.35 The resulting policy language is then meant to 
be sold to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of customers. The 
value of “getting it right” is so high to insurers that we might think it 
one of the least likely places to find a gap from failure of attention.  
 Courts do tend to assume insurers engage in strategic incomplete-
ness or indifferent incompleteness, as opposed to being frequently 
hampered by the cost of contracting.36 Strategy would explain inten-
tionally drafting or retaining ambiguous or incomprehensible lan-
guage to the insurer’s benefit. Indifference might explain allowing 
poor language that harms the consumer but not the insurer. Accord-
ing to the District of Columbia Circuit, this “obscurantism which 
conveys one meaning of their contracts to lawyers and another mean-
ing to laymen” requires a contra proferentem response from courts.37
While I have argued elsewhere that it makes more sense to view in-
surers as conveying one meaning to judges and no particular meaning 
to laymen,38 what matters here is the courts’ view of what insurers are 
doing; in short, what evil are courts combating with contra proferentem?  
                                                                                                                       
 33. Kenneth Abraham has briefly suggested the possibility that courts can apply con-
tra proferentem as a penalty default rule or as a majoritarian rule. See Kenneth S. Abra-
ham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 544-50 (1996).  
 34. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 92-94.  
 35. ISO formed in 1971 through the merger of similar entities for stock insurance 
companies (the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, later the Insurance  
Rating Bureau) and mutual insurance companies (the Mutual Insurance Rating  
Bureau), both of which had been drafting policy language for the entire industry since  
the early 1940s. See Douglas L. Talley, Proving Standard Policy Language of Missing  
Insurance Policies, IRMI.COM (June 2011), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2011/ 
talley06-risk-management-insurance-archeology.aspx. ISO bills itself as “the proper-
ty/casualty insurance industry's leading supplier of statistical, actuarial, underwriting, and 
claims data.” How ISO Serves the Property/Casualty Insurance Industry, ISO.COM,
http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/Overview/ISO-Services-for-Property-Casualty-Insurance.html 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
 36. See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 F.3d 38, 49-50 (2d 
Cir. 2003); New Castle Cnty., Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 243 F.3d 
744, 755-56 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 37. Buchanan v. Mass. Protective Ass’n, 223 F.2d 609, 612-13 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (finding 
ambiguity under accident insurance policy’s provision of disability benefits).  
 38. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006).  
2013] PENALTY DEFAULT RULES 313
 Courts may not know. The problem is that while courts can ob-
serve drafter action, or inaction, they cannot observe the cause. Con-
sider a case where insurers knowingly retain language that has given 
rise to litigation with claims of ambiguity.39 The strategic explanation 
is that the insurer gains from the ambiguity; the policy language 
somehow manages to preserve the veneer of coverage to the layman 
while inducing courts to exclude it. I have urged skepticism toward 
this as the primary explanation for ambiguity in insurance policies.40
Without repeating that argument in full, consider here that, at a 
minimum, most clauses that raise ambiguity claims are verbose, le-
galistic, and appear to repeatedly deny coverage. No one would think 
these clauses are meant to entice potential buyers.41 The clauses thus 
do not increase sales but do increase costly litigation.  
 No doubt ambiguous language can discourage a consumer from 
pursuing a claim or a suit, but so too would clear language excluding 
coverage. Add to this the fact that much policy language is shared 
across insurers, such that competitors use the same or similar lan-
guage, and the case for rampant strategic ambiguity is difficult to 
press.42 For the purposes at hand this need not be certain so much as 
plausible. If courts are ill suited to identify the cause of a gap, or if 
the cause varies, applying contra proferentem consistently as a de-
fault is a mistake.  
 Recall that the source of the gap dictates the choice of default. If, 
or when, courts are right that insurers are engaging in strategic in-
                                                                                                                       
 39. In homeowners insurance, the anti-concurrent cause clause is a strong example. 
One version of this clause reads: “We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or 
indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other 
cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.” INSURANCE
SERVICES OFFICE, INC., CAUSES OF LOSS—SPECIAL FORM CP 10 30 04 02, available at 
http://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/uploads/file/CP%2010%2030%2004%200
2.pdf. In General Commercial Liability policies, the “sudden and accidental” pollution ex-
clusion has caused courts great consternation. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 31. “In the 
context of pollution exclusions, insureds have argued quite vigorously that so-called ‘histor-
ical intent’ (much of which seems of questionable reliability) dictate how courts should 
narrowly construe those exclusions and indeed ignore the very words used in favor of some 
suggested original historical purpose.” George B. Hall Jr., An Historical Perspective on 
Attempted Recovery of Y2K Expenses Under Sue and Labor Clauses, 14 MEALEY’S LITIG.
REP.: INS., no. 4, 1999, at 12, 14, available at LEXIS 14-4 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Ins. 12; see 
also Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 942 (1988). 
 40. See Boardman, supra note 38 (analyzing three ways in which courts counter-intuitively 
reinforce the retention of unclear language through the application of interpretative principles). 
 41. The anti-concurrent cause clause cited supra note 39 does not give a potential 
policyholder an impending sense of wide coverage, for example. Likewise, the “absolute” 
pollution exclusion defines “pollutant” broadly and excludes coverage “for loss or damage 
caused by or resulting from . . . discharge, . . . seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘pol-
lutants.’ ” INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., supra note 39, at 2-4.   
 42. But see, Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation 
of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1405-06 (2007).  
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completeness, a penalty default is called for.43 The penalty forces the 
insurer to partially internalize the cost that ambiguity imposes on 
consumers and courts. But if insurers are not acting strategically, a 
penalty default is the wrong solution. If insurers are bowing to the 
costs of contracting, then the Ayres and Gertner analysis would call 
for a majoritarian default.44 It is costly for the parties to spell out 
every term, but the court can minimize their transaction costs by se-
lecting the term the parties would have consented to in the absence 
of transaction costs. 
 On the other hand, given the repeat-player, mass-player nature of 
insurance, perhaps courts should use a penalty default to give insur-
ers an incentive to state the majoritarian term because the court 
cannot identify that term and believes the insurer is in a better posi-
tion to do so. This is in keeping with the idea that “[i]f it is costly for 
the courts to determine what the parties would have wanted, it may 
be efficient to choose a default rule that induces the parties to con-
tract explicitly.”45 In cases where the larger repeat player does the 
drafting, “[t]he more informed party . . . may be able to amortize the 
cost of understanding and addressing the default rule over a number 
of transactions.”46 This possibility is examined in Part III.B. 
 A few examples of insurance gaps, and the use of contra 
proferentem to fill the gaps, are called for. This Part considers the 
two primary types of gaps—silent gaps and ambiguity gaps; there are 
others.47 The point is not to be exhaustive but to give concrete con-
tours to the discussion. To the extent these examples raise doubts 
about the appropriateness of contra proferentem as a penalty default 
rule, further doubting can be found in Part II. 
1.   The Silent Gap: “Water Below the Surface of the Ground” 
 A court excluded coverage for damage caused by “water below the 
surface of the ground.”48 In Adrian Associates, General Contractors v. 
National Surety Corp., the Texas Court of Appeals found the phrase 
                                                                                                                       
 43. See infra Part III; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 94. 
 44. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1594-96. 
 45. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 93. “Courts, which are publicly subsidized, should 
give parties incentives to negotiate ex ante by penalizing them for inefficient gaps.” Id.
 46. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in 
a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 532. 
 47. Note that the rule of lenity is a form of contra proferentem, where the drafter is 
the legislature. In keeping with this, Einer Elhauge conceives of the rule of lenity as a 
“preference-eliciting default rule[].” Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default 
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2192-93 (2002). As a penalty default rule, lenity is meant 
to give legislatures an incentive to be as clear as possible in drafting criminal statutes. See
id. at 2194; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 203, 256 (2010).  
 48. Adrian Assocs., Gen. Contractors v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 638 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. 
App. 1982). 
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ambiguous as to whether the water had to be from a natural source 
or any source.49 The insurer argued that because the phrase was un-
qualified, it applied to water from any source; this reading would 
have denied coverage in the case because the offending water from an 
underground water main was below the surface of the ground.50 The 
court found the clause ambiguous because it was (1) silent on the 
question and (2) preceded by two clauses, the first of which applied to 
water of natural origin and the second of which applied to water of 
artificial origin.51 According to the court, if the insurer intended “wa-
ter below the surface of the ground” to apply to “all” water below the 
surface of the ground, it “would have said so.”52
 To be clear, the two prior clauses applying first to natural source 
water and second to artificial source water did not draw the distinc-
tion explicitly but by clear implication. The first clause refers to 
“[f]lood, surface water, waves, tidal water” and the like, while the se-
cond refers to “water which backs up through sewers or basement 
drains.”53 One might think that a third clause referring to neither 
source would include both. The appellate court drew the opposite 
conclusion under contra proferentem.54
 The Adrian Associates court adopted a particularly strict version 
of contra proferentem, stating that at least as to exclusionary claus-
es, the construction “urged by the insured must be adopted as long 
as” it is not “unreasonable and even if the construction urged by the 
insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of 
the intent of the parties.”55 This case was later endorsed by the Texas 
Supreme Court, and “the position of the Texas Supreme Court is 
probably the majority rule” even though many jurisdictions might not 
adopt this extremely strict form of contra proferentem.56
 Adrian Associates is an example of one type of gap to which contra 
proferentem can be applied as a default rule. The gap, as described 
by the court, is silence where additional words would have clarified 
the meaning.57 In the language of default rules, the insurer has pri-
vate information—the sub-surface water exclusion applies to all wa-
ter—that it has failed to convey to the less informed party. More ab-
stractly, the insurer has information about how it wants an exclusion 
                                                                                                                       
 49. Id. at 140.  
 50. See id. at 138-39.  
 51. Id. at 140.  
 52. Id.
 53. Id.
 54. See id.
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. Michael Sean Quinn & L. Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 479, 543 (1995). The court itself cites other jurisdictions in agreement. See Adrian 
Assocs., 638 S.W.2d at 139. 
 57. See Adrian Assocs., 638 S.W.2d at 140. 
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to apply, and it has only revealed some of that information to the pol-
icyholder. (This description may sound silly on these facts but an un-
der-explained exclusion can indeed leave a contractual gap.) 
 This type of gap can be called the “silent gap.” Courts identify 
gaps from silence by working backward from the judge’s idea of a bet-
ter, more specific clause. The clause could have read “water below the 
surface of the ground from whatever source.” Instead, the argument 
goes, the insurer left out “from whatever source.” The insurer was 
silent where it should have spoken. Contra proferentem could oper-
ate here to give the insurer an incentive to more fully share the na-
ture of the exclusion with the policyholder. 
 The problem with the silent gap is that it may not be an empty 
hole waiting to be filled. Does the phrase “mental illness” include au-
tism?58 It would seem insulting to refer to an autistic person as men-
tally ill, but in the insurance context one can grant an ambiguity. 
The policyholder, arguing it does not include autism, probably has 
the sounder argument but, nonetheless, the insurer’s view, that it 
does include autism, is plausible. Thus there is a gap from silence in 
a policy that does not further define mental illness.59 This gap is  
robust because wherever one falls on the autism question, “mental 
illness” needs further description or else consumers and courts will 
also have to guess as to whether it includes alcoholism or ADHD, just  
to start. 
 But does “delivery on Tuesday” not exclude Wednesday because 
nothing is said of Wednesday? The clause could have read “delivery 
on Tuesday and not Wednesday,” after all. (Under the U.C.C. we 
might have usage of trade showing that delivery on any day means 
within a week of that date, but this is an implied term, not the result 
of ambiguity.) This is the type of “silence” maintained in “water be-
low the surface of the ground.” “Water below the surface of the 
ground,” would, without more, exclude “water below the surface of 
the ground from an artificial source.” The clause does not specify the 
source of the water, but neither does it specify the temperature or 
color of the water. The natural reading is that it applies to all water, 
including hot, green, artificial source water.  
 What is the precise failure of contra proferentem as an information-
forcing default for this type of silent gap? There is no gap to fill.  
2.   The Ambiguity Gap: “Civil Commotion” and Internal Conflict 
 A gap caused by ambiguity is more obvious and requires much less 
discussion than the silent gap. For example, was the 1970 hijacking 
of Pan American Flight 083 a form of “insurrection,” “rebellion,” or 
                                                                                                                       
 58. See Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 59. See id. at 536.  
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“civil commotion,” all of which were excluded under some of the rele-
vant contracts?60 Sound arguments are to be had in either direction. 
Some of these terms were themselves defined. The gap was not the 
result of silence but of an ill fit between the existing language and 
the facts of a politically motivated hijacking.61
 Ambiguous contract language, as written or as applied, leaves a 
court without one set of instructions to follow. Two sets of instruc-
tions leave a hole in the contract as much as missing instructions do. 
Insurance policies in particular can be structurally ambiguous. It 
“result[s] from ‘internal conflict’ between policy provisions that ren-
ders uncertain the meaning of the policy as a whole.”62 A grant of 
coverage, followed pages later by a partial exclusion, which itself in-
cludes an exception to the exclusion granting back to the consumer a 
subset of coverage, is a common structure for homeowners policies in 
particular.63 It may be possible to fit the pieces together in two plau-
sible arrangements: one favoring the insurer and one the consumer. 
As with “mental illness,” this type of ambiguity leaves the court 
without a clear command from the contract; there is a gap. 
C.   Filling Gaps by Penalty Default  
1.   The Initial Argument for Contra Proferentem as a Penalty Default 
 The argument for viewing contra proferentem as a penalty default 
rule is brief and straightforward. More interesting, and elaborate, is 
the succeeding analysis of reasons to think otherwise. Still, the case 
must first be made. As mentioned, it is common for scholars of penal-
ty defaults to note, but not dwell on, contra proferentem as an exam-
ple.64 Several insightful judges have also remarked on the possibil-
ity.65 But these treatments have been intentionally casual, a few lines 
here and there. 
 Contra proferentem is a default rule because it produces contract 
terms the parties can avoid by more explicit drafting. In insurance in 
particular, the default term it produces is “the policyholder receives 
coverage.” This is obviously not a mandatory rule because insurers 
can, and do, cover parts of a property or risk—not the entire risk—from 
                                                                                                                       
 60. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 994 (2d  
Cir. 1974).  
 61. See id. at 1022. 
 62. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 429 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 63. See, e.g., INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS 3—SPECIAL FORM NO. HO
00 03 10 00 (1999), available at http://www.insuringflorida.org/assets/docs/pdf/HO3_sample.pdf. 
 64. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 105 n.80; Ayres, supra note 18, at 596-98; 
Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree, supra note 17, at 391; Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without 
Consent, supra note 17, at 1840-41; Bratton, supra note 17, at 863; Posner, supra note 2,  
at 579-80.   
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 80-85 (discussing Judges Easterbrook and Calabresi). 
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harm caused by certain perils and not others. The contra proferentem 
doctrine does not turn insurance policies into automatic payment for 
all losses. As Judge Posner writes, “ ‘You wrote it, you lose’ is not the 
insurance law” of contra proferentem.66
 Contra proferentem is a penalty and information-forcing default 
rule because it seeks to fill a contractual gap with a term that one 
party does not want and has the power to avoid. The effect, and in-
tent, of the undesired default is to get the drafter to convey more in-
formation to the consumer. While there is an urge toward consumer 
protection in many opinions, the doctrine does not identify a term by 
the policyholder’s preference but by the insurer’s aversion—contra 
proferentem rather than pro lectore.
 Still, the “provide coverage” gap-filler is a little tricky to parse. 
The contra proferentem default takes the blunt position that the in-
surer would choose to deny coverage and the policyholder would 
choose to have coverage; this does not tell us where the two would 
have met had they hashed it out ex ante. It replicates only what the 
two parties are claiming in court ex post. From there, it takes the in-
surer/drafter’s desire to deny coverage and plugs in the contrary term.  
 Note that this is not anti-majoritarian so much as non-majoritarian. 
A penalty default is not the mirror opposite of a majoritarian default, 
which would “call on courts to duplicate the terms the parties would 
have selected, in their joint interest, if they had contracted explicit-
ly.”67 The majoritarian default thus focuses on both parties; a non-
majoritarian penalty can focus on one party—here the drafter. Be-
cause a policyholder in court is asking for coverage, contra 
proferentem does give the policyholder what she wants at that mo-
ment (even if she would not have wanted to pay a premium for the 
coverage when signing the contract). But by denying the drafter its 
preferred term, the rule is information-forcing. The target is the in-
surer, and the arrow is a term the target wishes to avoid.  
 Put another way, contra proferentem does not seek to mimic the 
bargain the parties would have reached together. It would often be 
impossible to apply if it did. For any given risk it is difficult to know 
what goes in the majoritarian box; policyholders do not want to pay 
for total coverage from all losses, and insurers want to sell only cov-
erage on which they can make a profit or meet market demand. For-
tunately, it should be easier for courts to identify what one party does 
not want than to identify the agreement they would have reached.  
 Later Parts explore the neglected question of whether contra 
proferentem truly does provide a penalty or whether insurers are 
                                                                                                                       
 66. Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 165 F.3d 
1157, 1160 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing contra proferentem in Illinois specifically). 
 67. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 1433 (emphasis added). 
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sometimes or often willing to accept the default “provide coverage.”68
For purposes of categorizing contra proferentem, however, it is 
enough to understand that (1) courts view the doctrine as one that 
dishes out an unpalatable term to insurers, the party with asymmet-
ric information and drafting control, and (2) courts apply the doctrine 
with penalty or motivational intent.  
2.   Reasons to Doubt Contra Proferentem as a Penalty Default 
 In this Part, I consider three reasons why contra proferentem might 
not be a penalty default rule. Consider the reasons contra proferentem 
could be a (1) mandatory, (2) majoritarian, (3) interpretive rule.
(a)   Mandatory or Default? 
 Is contra proferentem a mandatory rule? The doctrine itself is in-
escapable; a clause directing a court to avoid its use or to interpret 
ambiguities pro proferentem would have no legal effect.69 But the 
terms that are inserted into insurance policies under the doctrine are 
“gap” fillers that can be averted by a more artfully worded contract. 
They are variations on the default rule “provide coverage.”  
 Confusion has persisted on this point because of the looseness of 
the word “rule.” At times, “default rule” is used to refer to a specific 
default term. At other times, “default rule” is used to refer to a mech-
anism by which the content of a gap-filling term is selected. Many 
cases can be described either way. The relevant question is whether 
the rule creates a mechanism by which courts fill gaps ex post—it 
does—and whether the parties can take action to avoid application of 
the mechanism—they can.  
                                                                                                                       
 68. In this, as in other ways, contra proferentem closely resembles the Hadley rule, 
which Ayres later acknowledged “is not the cleanest example of a penalty default” because 
it may be that the majority of contractors do not avoid the term—they have average ex-
pected costs from delayed shipment and need no additional damages. See Ayres, supra note 
18, at 613.  
 69. On this view, Michael Rappaport concludes that contra proferentem “is not a de-
fault rule that the parties can contract around, but is a mandatory part of all insurance 
contracts to which it applies.” Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance 
Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L.
REV. 171, 186 n.35 (1995). Rappaport made this observation in passing and it is not central 
to his thesis. Id. Some courts refrain from applying contra proferentem to contracts be-
tween two sophisticated parties, especially where it is inaccurate to refer to one side or the 
other as “the drafter.” See id. at 256 n.244. These courts might allow such a clause to 
stand, but in consumer contracts the rule is immutable. Outside of insurance, Omri Ben-
Shahar has identified and explored a category of “pro-defendant” gap fillers to be applied 
when the parties deliberately leave a gap. See Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree, supra
note 17, at 390. Under this rule “a party who seeks enforcement of a deliberately incom-
plete agreement would be granted an option to enforce the transaction under the agreed-
upon terms supplemented with terms that are the most favorable (within reason) to the 
defendant.” Id.
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 The variations of “provide coverage” that contra proferentem cre-
ates are genuine defaults because they can be contracted around or 
avoided by giving information to the consumer. An insurer can re-
draft the ambiguous or unreadable clause and coverage can be de-
nied. Or an insurer can draw the consumer’s attention to policy limits 
during purchase; in many jurisdictions extrinsic evidence of this will 
be permitted to avoid a finding of ambiguity, and thus avoid the ap-
plication of contra proferentem.70
 In this way, contra proferentem is similar to the Hadley rule. The 
“rule” in Hadley v. Baxendale is that only foreseeable (or foretold) 
consequential damages will be awarded.71 We can say that this term 
is inserted into every contract that does not explicitly state other-
wise. But note that the many who have discussed Hadley do not envi-
sion the “opting out” of the rule to consist of an explicit contract 
term—“no consequential damages shall be awarded.”72 The benefit 
of the rule comes when a party with unusually high potential dam-
ages shares that fact, opening the door to a mutually agreed-upon 
distribution of the risk. 
 The analogy is not precise, but contra proferentem is similar. It is 
not a simple default term like so many that can be found in the 
U.C.C. “Unless otherwise agreed . . . the place of delivery of goods is 
the seller’s place of business or if none, the seller’s residence,” for ex-
ample.73 It is a rule that gives the parties two broad choices: either 
say nothing and accept the pro-policyholder class of default terms or
say something and craft your own term. Under Hadley, the choice is 
either say nothing and accept that consequential damages will be 
limited or reveal an unusual risk and explicitly assign it to one party. 
Under contra proferentem, the choice is either say nothing (by saying 
something ambiguous) and accept coverage or say something unam-
biguous and explicitly assign the risk to one party. 
                                                                                                                       
 70. Some jurisdictions apply contra proferentem if the text is unclear without first 
considering extrinsic evidence of intent or meaning. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 
482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985).  
 71. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.) 151. Recall that 
Hadley involved a miller with a broken crankshaft and no back-up shaft. Id. at 145. His 
mill remained idle until the shipper, his contracting partner, could send the broken form 
and return a replacement. Id. The shipper assumed, apparently based on standard prac-
tice, that the miller had another crankshaft and was not shut down while he awaited 
shipment. Id. at 151. The miller had unusually high consequential damages from delay 
because his mill was stopped while he awaited a new shaft. Id. at 146. Ayres & Gertner 
saw the consequential damages rule as a penalty default because it incents the unusual 
miller to convey his high need to the shipper, prompting the shipper to take more care. See
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 104.  
 72. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 103-04.  
 73. U.C.C. § 2-308 (2012). It is an interesting question whether the many “unless oth-
erwise agreed” default terms in the U.C.C. could be contracted around in one fell swoop: 
“No non-mandatory U.C.C. default terms shall apply to this contract.” If the contract did 
not specify a substitute method for filling gaps, this clause might fail. 
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 The background rule of Hadley is thus not meant to be avoided,
but rather it is meant to be fulfilled.74 The goal, as Ayres and others 
see it, is to cause the party with the risk of unusual consequential 
damages to reveal that risk during contracting, causing the other 
party to take extra precautions.75 Likewise, the purpose of contra 
proferentem is not to induce the drafter to explicitly avoid the rule by 
inserting a pro proferentem clause. The goal is to induce the drafter 
to avoid the default term. The goal is to cause the party with private 
knowledge to share it.  
 In short, contra proferentem is best thought of as a mandatory
doctrine that creates a subclass of default substantive rules.76
(b)   Majoritarian Default or Penalty Default? 
 Accepting that contra proferentem is a default rule, perhaps it is 
not a penalty default but a majoritarian default. (Whether the ideal 
form of the rule would operate as a majoritarian default is addressed 
in Part III.B below.) This could be true in two ways, one superficial 
and one serious. First, the existence of the contra proferentem doctrine 
itself might be something the majority of parties want. Second, the 
gap-filling terms the rule produces may be those the parties would 
have hypothetically consented to in the absence of transaction costs.  
 The first option is superficial because a rule can be popular with a 
majority of parties while still filling gaps with non-majoritarian 
terms. Hadley is likely such a rule “in the sense that a majority of 
contracting parties would prefer the rule that deters the strategic 
withholding of information by an unrepresentative minority.”77 The 
                                                                                                                       
 74. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an example of a majoritari-
an immutable rule. The rule is immutable in the sense that courts would not likely enforce 
this clause: “The covenant of good faith and fair dealing shall not apply to this contract.” 
The contours of the rule can be changed, however, in that if an act or option is explicitly 
anticipated or permitted in a contract, there can be no objection. “The general rule [regard-
ing the covenant of good faith] is plainly subject to the exception that the parties may, by 
express provisions of the contract, grant the right to engage in the very acts and conduct 
which would otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant . . . .” Carma Develop-
ers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 728 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (quoting 
VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773, 777-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)). 
 75. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 101-02. In the alternative, the newly in-
formed party can clarify that it refuses to take on the risk, leaving the first party to ar-
range for his own insurance against the possible loss.  
 76. Drafter confusion, and thus inefficiency, comes when the same mandatory proce-
dural rule contains both immutable and default substantive rules, as reasonable expecta-
tions does in many cases. The reasonable expectations principle may operate as a base 
immutable rule underneath a penalty default rule. Attempts to contract around the immu-
table rule incur a court’s wrath; for the sin of going too far, and misleading policyholders 
who do not know about the immutable rule, the term is reset to the policyholder’s best 
hopes, not his reasonable expectations. Ayres and Gertner call this type of rule “penalty 
reconstruction.” See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 121-23.   
 77. Ayres, supra note 18, at 612. Ayres acknowledges the truth behind Robert Scott’s 
point that Hadley is majoritarian in this sense. Id. (referring to Robert E. Scott, Rethinking 
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deterrence has majority support, but it is done by filling gaps with 
non-majority terms. With contra proferentem, the simplest reason it 
may be a majoritarian doctrine is that consumers demand a thumb 
on their scale in the face of difficult contract language they cannot 
change and that insurers bow to this market demand. Recall, of 
course, that to be majoritarian a rule does not have to fulfill both 
sides’ fantasy of the perfect contract; rather it is the rule they would 
have agreed to together had they agreed on a rule.78
 The second, more serious question then is whether the case-
specific default rules contra proferentem creates mimic those the par-
ties would have hypothetically chosen together. The short answer to 
this is that we should be agnostic on what the parties would have 
chosen. The slightly longer answer is that in some cases the “provide 
coverage” default will be what the parties would have agreed upon 
and in other cases it will not be. What is clear is that in applying con-
tra proferentem, the court is not attempting to determine what the 
parties would have jointly chosen.  
 Contra proferentem does not ask what was in the drafter’s ex ante
interest when the contract was written. That interest might include a 
term that is beneficial to the non-drafter—a pro-buyer term the 
drafter includes to make the product desirable. Contra proferentem 
instead takes a snapshot of the drafter’s interest ex post, at the mo-
ment of dispute; premiums have been paid, a loss has occurred, and 
the blunt assumption is that it is in the insurer-drafter’s interest to 
exclude coverage. Therefore, courts reason, construing a term to pro-
vide coverage is an incentive to the insurer to change the term, re-
turning it to its “desired” position of no coverage.  
 Courts have good reason to think this, given that the insurer is in 
court objecting to the interpretation that provides coverage. The in-
surer has basically stated that it does not want the written terms to 
provide coverage. But on this question, where are the many skeptics 
who assume insurers sell big and deliver little? If insurers are indeed 
trying to hoodwink consumers into buying attractive policies while 
simultaneously trying to avoid paying up after a loss, the insurers’ 
favored position would be to (1) keep the deceptively attractive term 
but (2) have that term interpreted to preclude coverage. It is true 
that contra proferentem can foil that plan by taking away (2), but 
given that the insurer still has (1), it is not obvious that redrafting is 
in the insurers’ interest. Moreover, the insurer only loses (2) for those 
policyholders who sue. Contra proferentem barely puts a chink in the 
                                                                                                                       
the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 85-86 (2003)). Ayres points out, however: “If we go far 
enough back behind the veil of ignorance, all information-forcing rules are majoritarian. From 
this perspective, the dichotomy between majoritarian and penalty defaults is false.” Id.
 78. For arguments supporting this position, see infra Part III.B (imagining contra 
proferentem as majoritarian default).  
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evil insurer’s armor, if it exists. Either way, the rule is not operating 
as either a de jure or de facto majoritarian rule. 
 Should it matter if the lawmaker understands a particular rule to 
operate as a penalty default or information-forcing rule? Ayres does 
not think so.79 If the goal is to assess whether a rule effectively and 
efficiently produces information, which is one goal of this Article, 
then the intent of a legislature or original lawmaker in making a rule 
does not seem to matter. Whatever the lawmakers’ intent, the rule 
may indeed force one or both parties to reveal information by pre-
senting a default option they wish to avoid.  
 A few courts have considered the possibility that contra proferentem 
operates as a penalty. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opin-
ion written by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, has referred to the possible 
role of contra proferentem as a penalty default.80 Citing Ayres and 
Gertner, Judge Easterbrook writes that “[p]erhaps the interpretive 
principle [of contra proferentem] could be recast as one requiring the 
insurer to come forth with information in its possession but unknown 
to the insured.”81 But Judge Easterbrook does not find that the state 
at hand (Wisconsin) “has . . . suggested this understanding of its ap-
proach, perhaps because it doubts judicial ability to determine how 
much information is optimal.”82
 The Second Circuit has also considered the possibility of penalty 
defaults in insurance interpretation.83 If risk-expanding interpreta-
tive approaches are penalty defaults, “expanded coverage to the det-
riment of insurers in all-risk policies is justified since such expan-
sions give insurers, who presumably have better knowledge of insur-
ance laws than do insureds, a powerful incentive to insert explicit 
language into policies, thereby informing the insureds as to the pre-
cise scope of coverage.”84 On this reading, the penalty is aimed at get-
ting more information to consumers, not courts. “The same argu-
ment,” the court continued “can be used in support of the rule of in-
terpreting ambiguities in insurance contracts against the insurer.”85
                                                                                                                       
 79. Ayres, supra note 18, at 592-93. “A broad definition of defaults lets lawmakers and 
analysts assess whether the choice of a given displaceable rule is best defended on the 
grounds of its informational impact.” Id. at 592.  
 80. See Harnishfeger Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 976 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 81. Id.
 82. Id. He goes on to say, with information “there is always ‘more,’ and the evolution 
of ‘warning’ (i.e., disclosure) claims in the law of products liability provides ground to doubt 
that the principle could be confined.” Id. 
 83. See City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 F.3d 38, 49, 49 n.10 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1995). Both opin-
ions were authored by Judge Guido Calabresi, who is also a colleague of Ian Ayres at Yale  
Law School. 
 84. City of Burlington, 332 F.3d at 49 (discussing Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1).  
 85. Id. at 49 n.10. In an earlier insurance case, Judge Calabresi noted that a penalty 
default might be appropriate if insurers were strategically withholding information, alt-
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 Of course, those who argue that the lawmakers’ intent is neces-
sary to the identification of a penalty default rule do not take the po-
sition that the lawmaker must use a phrase like “penalty default” or 
“information-forcing rule.” Indeed, contra proferentem may be the 
only default that can pass the intent test by merely stating the rule. 
The rule operates by applying a meaning that one party does not 
want, explicitly looking for the option that is counter to the drafter’s 
hypothetical consent. It also explicitly anticipates that the drafter 
will improve in the future by providing better information.  
 Thus far, then, the rule can be seen as a mandatory doctrine cre-
ating a sub-class of default terms that insurers are meant to opt out 
of by conveying more information to policyholders. But, lastly, per-
haps contra proferentem is only an “interpretative presumption” and 
not a default rule at all.86
(c)   Interpretative Rule or Penalty Default? 
 Whether contra proferentem is an interpretive rule is not a new 
question. While it is commonly and casually referred to as one, Ar-
thur Corbin thought otherwise:  
The rule is not actually one of interpretation, because its applica-
tion does not assist in determining the meaning that the two par-
ties gave to the words, or even the meaning that a reasonable per-
son would have assigned to the language used. It is chiefly a rule 
of policy, generally favoring the underdog. It directs the court to 
choose between two or more possible reasonable meanings on the 
basis of their legal operation, i.e., whether they favor the drafter or 
the other party.87
This reasoning explains why contra proferentem is often thought of 
as a rule of last resort, only to be used if other means of interpreta-
tion, including examining extrinsic evidence, fail.88 On this view, the 
rule is not one of interpretation because it is applied only after the 
court has concluded it cannot interpret the language directly or make 
sense of the parties’ joint intent.  
 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts takes a mixed view: contra 
proferentem “is in strictness a rule of legal effect, sometimes called 
construction, as well as interpretation: its operation depends on the 
                                                                                                                       
hough not in the specific context of contra proferentem. See Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 
at 268-69, 269 n.1. 
 86. Posner, supra note 2, at 578-80.  
 87. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27, at 306 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998) (em-
phasis added). This paragraph was cited approvingly by the Michigan Supreme Court in an 
insurance case. See Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 456 (Mich. 2003). 
 88. Not everyone believes the rule should be limited to last place. Some judges argue 
that when applying contra proferentem to a contract “drafted entirely by one party, with-
out any bilateral negotiations,” it should not be used as a last resort but as a “primary rule 
of construction.” Klapp, 663 N.W.2d at 460 (Weaver, J., concurring). 
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positions of the parties as they appear in litigation, and sometimes 
the result is hard to distinguish from a denial of effect to an uncon-
scionable clause.”89 In the insurance context specifically, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court has rejected this equating of rules of legal effect 
with rules of construction:  
In our judgment, the rule of contra proferentem is not a rule of 
construction, rather . . . it is a rule of legal effect. While rules of 
construction are designed to help determine the parties’ intent, the 
rule of contra proferentem is designed to resolve a dispute where 
the parties’ intent cannot be determined.90
 If the goal of modern interpretation is to determine the meaning 
the parties attached to the words at the time of contracting, counting 
the words themselves as primary but not exclusive evidence, contra 
proferentem is not a rule of interpretation. At least in the consumer 
insurance context, the rule may endorse a position that the consumer 
had ex ante, but this is not required. It is, as Corbin writes, a rule 
“favoring the underdog.”91 The enforced meaning is a matter of con-
sumer protection and insurer penalty, not ex ante consumer intent.  
 This question matters because, as Eric Posner argues, if it oper-
ates at the interpretive stage and not the gap-filling stage, contra 
proferentem is probably not a default rule.92 In his framework, a 
court must complete five stages in order to award damages.93 In stage 
three a court “determine[s] what the contract says” (interpretation), 
and in stage four the court applies a default rule if there is a gap.94
He does not hang his hat on where the gap must be found, but he 
seems to place the task of identifying a gap at stage three.95
 Posner is not committed to rejecting all interpretive presumptions 
as outside of the set of default rules because “[a]rguably” they are 
“analytically the same as default rules.”96 To the extent he explores 
the separation, however, he is off about contra proferentem because 
he conflates the question of ambiguity with the application of contra 
proferentem. At stage three, a court considering contra proferentem 
must decide if a term is ambiguous (or unfathomable). If it is, the 
                                                                                                                       
 89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS.2D § 206, cmt. a (emphasis added). Section 
206 is entitled “Interpretation Against the Draftsman” and reads: “In choosing among the 
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is general-
ly preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writ-
ing otherwise proceeds.” Id.
 90. Klapp, 663 N.W.2d at 457 (citation omitted). 
 91. 5 CORBIN, supra note 87, § 24.27, at 306. 
 92. See Posner, supra note 2, at 578-80. 
 93. See id. at 565 (explaining that stage one is following contract formation formali-
ties, stage two is confirming real consent, and stage five is awarding a remedy if a term has  
been violated). 
 94. Id.
 95. See id. at 579.  
 96. Id. at 566.  
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court declares a gap; where there should be a term there is a blank, 
gibberish, or two terms. The court then moves on to stage four, insert-
ing the default. Posner’s latent premise must be that because contra 
proferentem also tells the court how to determine what the default is,
it is interpretive and therefore still operating at stage three.  
 This is fair enough. With many other rules there is no stage at 
which the content of the default rule is determined; the rule simply 
provides the content. If there is no term disclaiming warranties in 
writing, the U.C.C. fills in the warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for purpose.97 But upon reflection it is not so uncommon to have 
a default rule that requires more work than confirming a missing 
term.98 Under U.C.C. section 2-305, “Open Price Term,” if a contract 
does not give a price, the court must determine the reasonable mar-
ket price.99 The default price is not five or five hundred dollars; it is 
an instruction that requires fact gathering.  
 With contra proferentem, at stage three the court determines if 
the term is ambiguous (if yes, then there is a gap) and at stage four it 
applies the default, following the instruction on how to fill the gap. In 
insurance, this instruction amounts to “the policyholder’s loss is cov-
ered.”100 Identifying the precise term requires an extra step; it is not 
“cover loss to the unattached fence” for all contracts any more than 
the section 2-305 default is “$1,000” for all contracts.  
 There are several points to note here. First, as will be explored 
later, this may reveal one way in which insurance contra proferentem 
is a default rule while non-insurance contra proferentem is a rule of 
interpretation only. The insurer’s permanent status as drafter, com-
bined with the assumption that “against” the drafter means “provide 
coverage,” allows for a far more specific default rule in insurance. 
“Where [an] act of interpretation is carried out according to a pre-
dictable rule, parties will contract around it just as they would a pure  
statutory default.”101
 Second, I do not mean to say there is nothing interpretive about 
the contra proferentem instruction. Although some courts seem un-
clear on the concept, contra proferentem is meant to be a rule of last 
                                                                                                                       
 97. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (2012). 
 98. Even under the Hadley rule, if the contract says nothing about consequential 
damages, the court must take the step of determining if the damages were foreseeable or 
foretold, and only then apply the default rule. See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 565-67. The 
default rule is still one rule (no consequential damages), but it requires a step that does not 
fit neatly into either stage three or four. It is not interpretation, finding the gap, or insert-
ing the default. See generally Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.) 151. 
 99. U.C.C. § 2-305 (2012). Posner agrees that section 2-305 is a default rule, just not a 
penalty one. See Posner, supra note 2, at 576. 
 100. It is, or can be, more nuanced than this, of course.  
 101. Ayres, supra note 18, at 596 (emphasis added).
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resort, a rule of construction.102 Only after all other interpretive 
methods have been exhausted—and the court is still left with  
language that either has no clear meaning or two plausible mean-
ings—is contra proferentem to apply. Then, perhaps at stage three 
and one-half, contra proferentem provides the substance of the de-
fault rule. In theory, this default is based on one possible reading or 
interpretation of the language. On the other hand, there are times 
when it cannot be said that the term the court adopts using contra 
proferentem is an interpretation of the written term. The written 
term is jettisoned, and the default term is “coverage” of whatever loss 
the discarded term was meant to address.  
 Implicitly, part of Posner’s point about interpretation rules seems 
to be that they cannot be contracted around.103 This is true of some 
interpretative rules but not others. Within bounds, the parol evidence 
rule can be altered by merger clauses. Parties can specify that terms 
are to be read in a technical light. Parties can state that a contract or 
a clause is not to be interpreted in light of trade usage. The individu-
al substantiations of contra proferentem can be avoided by clear 
drafting, at least the theory goes. 
 At last, we do not need to use the interpretation stage question as 
an intermediary; we can ask directly whether contra proferentem is a 
mandatory rule. In the end, then, this question comes back to my de-
scription of contra proferentem as an immutable procedural rule that 
governs a class of substantive default rules.  
III.   SHOULD CONTRA PROFERENTEM BE A PENALTY DEFAULT RULE?
 However one comes down on whether contra proferentem is a 
penalty default rule, its application has potential information-forcing 
                                                                                                                       
 102. To understand the extent to which modern contra proferentem has reshaped 
the way courts resolve policy disputes, it is useful to trace its evolution from 
(a) a rule of last resort allowing courts to construe ambiguities against 
drafters in those relatively rare instances where the meaning of the disputed 
terms could not be discerned through examining extrinsic evidence of the 
parties’ intent, dealings and trade usage, to (b) a pro-insured rule in which 
any ambiguity in the relevant policy language is automatically construed in 
favor of coverage, without any need to evaluate extrinsic evidence concern-
ing the parties’ intent. 
1 DAVID L. LEITNER ET AL., 1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION.
§ 1:11 (updated 2012).  See also, e.g., Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 
447, 460 (Mich. 2003) (Weaver, J., concurring) (agreeing that the general rule is to apply 
contra proferentem as “last resort,” but arguing that when “a contract is drafted entirely by 
one party, without any bilateral negotiations, [contra proferentem] should be applied as the 
primary rule of construction”). 
 103. Posner does not state this explicitly in his discussion of contra proferentem but 
takes this position elsewhere and it seems to motivate the stage three/stage four analysis. 
See Posner, supra note 2, at 566.  
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effects.104 Indeed, the analysis that the penalty default concept opens 
up is uniquely applicable to contra proferentem because contra 
proferentem has as its justification (1) applying an undesirable (i.e., 
non-majoritarian) term that (2) forces clearer information from the 
drafter. Information-forcing is, at a minimum, half the purpose of the 
rule, with immediate consumer protection being the second purpose. 
The long-term goal of encouraging clear drafting is both preventative 
and prospective. Courts can add to this goal the immediate benefit, or 
so it seems, of protecting the individual consumer in court. 
 This second Part of the Article therefore uses the penalty default 
model to examine whether contra proferentem achieves its aim, and 
if it does, whether the price is too high. It is one thing to identify the 
category of penalty default rules or to confirm the identity of a par-
ticular default rule. It is another thing altogether to conclude that a 
rule should operate as a penalty. Naturally, Ayres and Gertner have 
concerns, and others, including Posner, have strong doubts, about 
whether lawmakers will be able to select an optimal penalty de-
fault.105 But Ayres argues that the most plausible penalty defaults 
can be crafted when the more knowledgeable party is a repeat player 
and the “asymmetric information [is] about the content of the law 
itself” and “the precise terms of the contract.”106 Insurers—and insur-
ance contracts—fit this bill or no one does. 
 Contra proferentem in particular follows the instruction: “In the 
face of asymmetric legal information, a straightforward solution is to 
set the default against the more knowledgeable party.”107 This has ab-
stract appeal and may work in another setting Ayres proposes—retail 
business—but insurance throws up roadblocks worth considering.108
The next two Parts ask: 
(1) Assuming contra proferentem effectively incents cleaner 
language (in initial drafting and redrafting), does more 
information reach consumers?  
(2) When contra proferentem does not result in redrafted 
language, does the rule harm consumers on net?  
To ask these questions is to also ask, in the language of penalty defaults: 
(1) Does the penalty operate as a penalty, at least a decent 
percentage of the time? 
(2)  Is the asymmetry of information equalized or improved? 
                                                                                                                       
 104. This is also true of majoritarian default rules, it is readily recognized, because 
those with unusual preferences reveal them in response to the default. See id. at 580.  
 105. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 1609; Posner, supra note 2, at 570. 
 106. Ayres, supra note 18, at 597. 
 107. Id.
 108. Id. (“The repeat player—think retail business or insurance company—is more 
likely to learn the content of the legal rule than the one-off consumer.”). 
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(3) Do the costs of the rule overwhelm the benefits? Would a 
majoritarian rule fare better? 
Part II.A addresses effectiveness: whether contra proferentem is ef-
fective in getting more information out of insurers and in getting 
more information to consumers. Part II.B assumes that contra 
proferentem does get more information to consumers and addresses 
efficiency: whether this is worth the cost the rule imposes. 
 A.   Is it Effective? 
1.   How Consumers Respond to the Rule 
 The function of a penalty is to give one or both parties an incen-
tive to contract around the default, thus revealing information to the 
other party or to a third-party, usually the courts. Contra 
proferentem is meant to operate as the former, “giving a more in-
formed contracting party incentives to reveal information to a less 
informed party.”109 In order for this type of information-forcing de-
fault to make sense, it has to be possible for the party with the pri-
vate or hidden information to convey more information. If that party 
is speaking to consumers, the consumers must not be deaf to it.  
 In order for an information-forcing default to make sense in insur-
ance, then, it has to be possible for the insurer to convey more infor-
mation to policyholders. Presumably, this information will be con-
veyed in the text of the insurance policy.110 Additional explanations 
and more clearly written terms would convey additional information 
to courts and to sophisticated policyholders. But if the information 
target is a consumer, what result? 
 The extent to which consumers read or understand their consumer 
contracts is a fight this Article will not seek to resolve. Instead, we 
                                                                                                                       
 109. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 97. 
 110. Very limited additional information could be conveyed in person or otherwise at 
the time of contracting. Some information can be conveyed outside of the policy text, of 
course. This is the primary vision of Hadley, that the rare shipper with a stopped mill will 
share his extraordinary costs of delay with the shipper, in person, at the time of contract-
ing. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.) 151; see also Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 1, at 104. This works when the information asymmetry is limited to 
one piece of information. The asymmetry in insurance, and consumer contracts generally, 
is systematic. What few pieces of information should homeowners’ insurers or their agents 
add to the sale or delivery discussion? In many locations a clear discussion of flood exclu-
sions is called for, and had. Perhaps the anti-concurrent cause clause should be discussed. 
(If a covered cause of loss and a non-covered cause contribute to a single loss, the loss may 
not be covered). Or the agent should explain the exception to the general mold exclusion 
providing coverage for mold if it results from certain other covered losses. Even if insurers 
performed an analysis to identify and rectify the top three areas of possible concern, many 
areas would remain unexplained. In the end, consumers get the bulk of their perceptions of 
insurance policies from two sources: (1) their pre-conceptions based on experience and the 
purpose of the policy and (2) whatever policy language they happen to read. See generally 
Boardman, supra note 22. 
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can consider what would follow from applying an information-forcing 
rule to consumer contracts under several visions of consumer  
engagement. The three options considered are imprecise; option 
one—consumers do not read; option two—some read some text, but 
we do not know how much; option three—some consumers read ex
post. Assuming for the moment a penalty default rule that aims to 
get information to consumers and not courts, here is what follows 
from the various levels of engagement: 
Option 1: Consumers do not read their contracts and will 
not. Improving a clause here and there changes nothing. 
If this is correct, information-forcing rules aimed at consumers are 
inappropriate; they raise the costs for the drafter without providing 
any benefit to the consumer. The rule prompts the delivery of infor-
mation, but it does not ensure the receipt of it. You can improve the 
horse’s water, but you can’t make it drink.  
 There is another subclass of inappropriate application that does 
not turn on whether consumers read but on whether they can  
understand. If no amount of rewriting or explanation can make a 
complex concept accessible to the average buyer, “forcing” the sophis-
ticated party to reveal more information has no effect. Kenneth 
Abraham describes two versions of contra proferentem, for example, 
one of which is a rule of strict liability.111 “If a policy provision is  
‘ambiguous’—reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation 
by the ordinary reader of the policy—then the provision is inter-
preted against the drafter and the interpretation more favorable to 
the insured governs, even if the provision could not reasonably be made 
less ambiguous.”112
 The resurrection of contra proferentem as a rule that clarifies lan-
guage to courts rather than consumers is discussed below. If courts 
can expend less time and effort to understand contractual language 
and get more accurate results, clearer language has a clear benefit. 
The problem is that the rule is not set to be triggered by judge-read 
ambiguity or to be satisfied by redrafting such that a judge under-
stands. The rule requires the judge to base the ambiguity finding on 
the likelihood that a consumer would find the language ambiguous  
or confusing.  
 There is good reason to be skeptical of Option 1 in the insurance 
context. Policyholders have an extra chance to read their contracts, 
after a loss has occurred, even if they do not read at purchase.113
Nonetheless, the more reality resembles zero consumer engagement, 
the less sensible is a penalty default aimed at producing information 
                                                                                                                       
 111. See Abraham, supra note 33, at 537-50. 
 112. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).  
 113. See Boardman, supra note 22, at 1080-81. 
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to unengaged consumers. This brings us to the balancing of the next 
two options. 
Option 2: We are unsure how much consumers read or un-
derstand their contracts, but we know that some consumers 
read some parts some of the time.  
If this is correct, and the intended result of an information-forcing 
rule is the production of the information, not its sure receipt, then 
penalty default rules may succeed in that goal. We may not be sure 
how much information consumers take in, but we can still hold the 
drafter responsible for the drafting. Of course, the lower one’s expec-
tations of its eventual receipt, the lower the expected value of forcing 
the drafter’s hand in the first place. (If the rule is also meant to con-
vey information to courts, the expected value goes up.) 
 Moreover, the value of an information-forcing default rule must be 
judged in the aggregate. With the right rule, some information will 
get through to some consumers. Perhaps more accessible information 
over time will increase consumer engagement or slowly seep into the 
general public understanding. Others may be able to accurately cal-
culate how much information is accurately conveyed by operation of 
the rule; I cannot. The point here will play out in the next Part when 
the costs of the rule are weighed against its probable value. For now, 
Option 2 suggests that some value could be had from a penalty de-
fault aimed at resolving consumer ignorance.  
Option 3: Consumers, and their lawyers, do read their con-
tracts after a problem arises. 
 If this view of consumer engagement is correct, information-
forcing defaults may partially succeed and contribute more value 
than can be expected under the other scenarios. We may be skeptical 
that consumers read much during the purchase of a product or ser-
vice. But after the product has failed or, in insurance, a loss has oc-
curred, consumers get a second chance.114 You may have skipped the 
warranty when purchasing your computer but if it breaks two weeks 
later, you will either read it before calling to request repair or read it 
after you have been told you are out of luck. Similarly, you may have 
skimmed the front page of your homeowners policy, but after exten-
sive water damage from a broken pipe, the policy will tell you how to 
make a claim, whom to call, how long you have to call, how to gather 
evidence before cleaning up, if you need to use an approved vendor to 
clean up, or whether you are covered at all. Of course, some policy-
holders will call the insurer to get this information; those who are 
disappointed with what they hear then have an incentive to see if the 
policy promises more. 
                                                                                                                       
 114. See id. “On the back end, after a loss, is precisely when a policyholder experiences 
the true operation of the product he has purchased.” Id. at 1085. 
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 Giving consumers an accurate sense of their rights after failure or 
loss may thus be the more likely consumer use of a contract than 
reading before purchase. It may also be the more valuable use—more 
valuable than a consumer reading the clause before or during pur-
chase. In most cases, the ex ante read does not give the consumer the 
power to change a clause.115 The most likely, but still unlikely, ex ante
response would require a consumer to dislike the clause more than 
he likes the product. Then he will switch products, if he can get a 
substitute product without the objectionable clause. The ex post read, 
on the other hand, opens more opportunities; it can tell the consum-
ers whether to avoid the seller in the future for failing to meet its 
promises, whether and how hard to pursue a claim, and whether to 
praise or bash the product to others.116
 There is reason to expect this “second read” opportunity to be 
more common with insurance contracts than with other consumer 
contracts, if for no other reason than many other forms of consumer 
contract are long gone by the time a good fails. The back of a shop-
ping receipt may tell you how many days you have to return a televi-
sion or dress, if you still have the receipt. The warranty provisions 
that accompany your television may be available online, if you bother 
to look for it. On the other hand, it may take a minute to find, but a 
copy of your automobile insurance and homeowners insurance poli-
cies are probably in a desk drawer. 
 This is not to make a stark empirical claim about the level of con-
sumer engagement in either insurance or other areas. While there is 
reason for optimism that that penalty defaults aimed at informing 
consumers might be more effective in insurance than other areas, 
“more” may mean the consumer engagement number moves from ten 
percent to twenty. The point here is to raise skepticism about the ap-
propriateness of penalty defaults when the rule is meant to divulge 
information to consumers in a consumer contract. “It is socially de-
sirable for there to be communication . . . if and only if the social val-
ue of information exceeds the minimized cost of communication.”117
The effectiveness of the default must be discounted by the chance 
that the contract will be read. I do not purport to quantify that 
                                                                                                                       
 115. See id. at 1081-82. 
 116. With cleaner insurance contract language, 
 policyholders will: (1) more accurately judge whether an insurer has breached; 
(2) share that judgment with other consumers; (3) share that judgment with 
the state insurance commissioner; (4) decide to switch insurers; (5) decide to 
purchase different coverage from the same insurer; (6) decide to act because a 
risk (flood) or an object (boat) is not covered; or (7) decide to sue.   
Id. at 1081. One through four and seven are all relevant after a loss, usually long after the 
contract has been made. 
 117. Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 4, at 289 (emphasis added) (“communication costs” 
are a subset of transaction costs). 
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chance, but I do feel comfortable omitting a possible “Option 4: Many 
consumers read much of their contract language.”  
2.   How Insurers Respond to the Rule 
 In asking how consumers would respond to the rule, the proceed-
ing Part assumed that insurers would respond to contra proferentem 
as the rule envisions—by redrafting and clarifying language the 
courts found ambiguous. This is only one possible response to the 
rule, however. Call it the redraft response. Another option is to re-
draft the policy language to include the coverage the courts extended 
through contra proferentem. Call it the acceptance response. The 
third option is to leave the language as it is, knowing there will be 
future litigation and that some, perhaps most, courts will hold that 
the language extends coverage. Call it a non-response, or call it cra-
zy.118 There has not been empirical work on the percentage of re-
sponses that fall into each category. That there are substantial num-
bers in each category is clear. 
 The choice behind the redraft response is obvious. A court has 
found a clause—usually an exclusion of coverage—ambiguous and 
granted coverage to the policyholder under contra proferentem. The 
insurer wanted to deny coverage for a certain risk before the case 
went to litigation, and it continues to want to deny coverage for that 
risk. In order to do so, it must restate the exclusion, or courts in that 
jurisdiction, and perhaps elsewhere, will continue to extend cover-
age.119 In short, the redraft response is the natural envisioned re-
sponse to contra proferentem. The perceived problem is a gap from 
poor drafting, and the solution is to fill the gap with clear drafting.  
 What then could motivate the acceptance response? The insurer 
had wanted to exclude coverage of a particular risk prior to litigation 
but is now willing to redraft the contract to extend coverage. The 
most positive explanation is that the insurer has learned from poli-
cyholder response, including multiple suits in multiple jurisdictions, 
that the public wants this aspect of coverage. The market demands 
it. If the insurer does not deem the risk uninsurable (broad terrorism 
                                                                                                                       
 118. While the Third Circuit did not outright use the word “crazy,” it did rail against 
the fact that insurers retained certain language despite the fact that it was “widely used in 
insurance policies and has been the subject of heated litigation throughout the entire coun-
try over the past thirty years.” New Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pa., 243 F.3d 744, 747 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 119. A few courts will take a dispute among jurisdictions as proof of ambiguous lan-
guage. “The mere fact that several . . . courts have ruled in favor of a construction denying 
coverage, and several others have reached directly contrary conclusions, viewing almost 
identical policy provisions, itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the provision in 
issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation,” and is therefore ambiguous. Little v. 
MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Cohen v. 
Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)). 
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coverage) or undesirable (life insurance for suicides within the first 
year after sale), it goes into the contract and the risk is folded into  
the price.  
 Another possibility is that the insurer still prefers not to provide 
coverage but is skeptical that courts will ever accept the exclusion, 
however drafted. If the coverage seems “mandatory,” for public policy 
reasons or because courts find it is within the “reasonable expecta-
tions” of policyholders, it may be wiser to accept the inevitable and 
avoid further litigation.120 Moreover, for insurers involved in collec-
tive drafting through the Insurance Services Office, the competitive 
effect of accepting coverage will be limited.121 The new form of coverage 
will be extended by each insurer, and each will accept the cost of the  
new risk. 
 Perhaps the most puzzling response is the non-response. That this 
response happens not infrequently should be enough to give pause 
about the effective operation of contra proferentem.122 With non-
response, the insurer has decided to accept coverage for those cases 
that go to litigation but to keep the contract language as is.123 This 
provides multiple benefits. First, the insurer can now consider the 
clause defined based on the court’s interpretation. In many cases the 
insurer may care more for a settled meaning than a particular mean-
ing; if the cost of the new interpretation can be passed onto consum-
ers, the predictable interpretation has great value to the insurer.124
 As I have discussed in an earlier piece, “[i]f instead the insurer 
redrafts the clause . . . the insurer rolls the dice . . . . Perhaps the 
court will . . . find the redraft ambiguous. Or perhaps it will become 
clear that the court has no intention of accepting the clause in any 
                                                                                                                       
 120. The reasonable expectations doctrine holds: “The objectively reasonable expecta-
tions of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts 
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated 
those expectations.” Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Pro-
visions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). The doctrine is recent; in the early 1960s courts 
began to “clearly and explicitly employ[] the doctrine of honoring reasonable expectations.” 
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a)(3), at 632 (Practitioner ed. 
1988). David Horton contends that the rise of the reasonable expectations doctrine led to 
the “fall of the strict against-the-drafter doctrine.” David Horton, Flipping the Script: Con-
tra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 451 (2009). 
 121. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 122. For examples of the non-response, including the continued use of “property dam-
age” despite its ambiguity as to “electronic data,” see Boardman, supra note 38, at 1115-16. 
 123. See, e.g., New Castle Cnty., 243 F.3d at 755 (“[I]n spite of this extensive history of 
litigation, and obvious disagreement amongst courts and parties alike, insurance compa-
nies . . . continue to use the phrase without any language defining its scope.”); W. Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. D & J Enters., Inc., 720 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Mo. 1986) (Blackmar, J., dissenting) 
(“This insurance company has perpetuated the language, without substantial change. It 
took no steps to clear up the confusion which numerous other courts have perceived.”). 
 124. Policyholders are worse off because unclear language has become directly 
misleading language. 
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form,” as described above.125 “Insurers are risk-averse and this game 
is not worth the candle. Unless the insurer cannot live with the cov-
erage the court has found in its ambiguous clause, insurers find it 
better to provide the coverage and raise the premium.”126
 In other words, “[b]etter to keep the language clear to the court,
even if it means retaining language the court has ruled ambiguous, 
since at least this language [now] has a settled judicial meaning.”127
The non-responsive insurer thus “accept[s] an adverse interpretation, 
changing premiums in lieu of changing [the contract].”128 This differs 
from the acceptance response in that the insurer can anticipate ongo-
ing litigation on the language from confused consumers. On the other 
hand, since the language continues to purport to deny coverage, the 
insurer should be able to avoid actually providing coverage for the 
dominant percentage of consumers who do not sue.  
 From the standpoint of a penalty default rule, the non-response is 
an instance of the rule failing to operate. The rule imposes a cost for 
the purpose of incenting the disclosure of additional information, but 
no new information is forthcoming. In fact, the information asym-
metry between insurer and consumer is markedly increased because 
the insurer now knows that language purporting to deny coverage 
will in fact be read by courts to provide coverage; the consumer con-
tinues to either be confused or to mistakenly believe a court would 
not grant coverage.  
 But what of the acceptance response? It does lead to the revelation 
of more information, but it simultaneously changes the content of 
that information. If policyholders in the aggregate do not want to pay
for a particular form of coverage (let us assume everyone likes free 
coverage), will they be better off with an ambiguous denial of cover-
age, and no fee, than with a clearer statement of coverage for a fee? 
 The tentative conclusion of this section is that as an information-
forcing rule contra proferentem is spotty at best. When insurers fail 
to respond to the penalty, consumers are left with less information, 
not more. When insurers change the relevant language, consumers 
may become aware of the change in only a few circumstances. Time 
then to consider the efficiency of contra proferentem. 
 B.   Is it Efficient?  
 Asking if contra proferentem is effective is to ask what the bene-
fits of the rule are. This Part now turns to the potential costs of the 
rule and attempts to weigh the two. Contra proferentem could be  
                                                                                                                       
 125. Boardman, supra note 22, at 1080. 
 126. Id.
 127. Id. (emphasis added). 
 128. Boardman, supra note 38, at 1118 (emphasis added). 
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inefficient because the costs outweigh the benefits, or it could be 
suboptimal in that it produces a net positive but less benefit than an 
alternative rule. This Part will thus also consider two alternative 
versions of the rule, one as a penalty default aimed at better inform-
ing courts, not consumers, and the second as a majoritarian rule.  
1.   The Cost of the Rule to Consumers 
(a) When Insurers Redraft  
 Does contra proferentem operate efficiently under the redraft 
response? The primary cost of redrafting is borne initially by the 
drafter—the insurer, multiple insurers, or the industry if collectively 
drafting. To the extent the threat of the rule leads to cleaner first 
drafts, there may be an added initial expense at first drafting, but it 
could be slight. A secondary cost falls on state insurance commission-
ers and their offices; states vary by the extent to which new language 
must be approved before use.129 There may be additional trickle-down 
costs. Brokers who sell insurance, for example, will have to learn 
about and understand the operation of new language, and a few who 
fail may mislead consumers about potential coverage. 
 On the other side of the scale, the benefits of redrafting could be 
dramatic. First, we can assume the experience of redrafting will 
cause insurers to take more care in their initial drafting. Assume for 
the moment, although it is doubtful, that this increase in care is war-
ranted and not wasteful. Second, if the targeted language were truly 
ambiguous, and if the redraft is clear, it will improve consumer use, 
cabin opportunistic denials of coverage by insurers, decrease overall 
litigation, and decrease the courts’ costs in reaching accurate hold-
ings. Some of these benefits stem from the positive externality of im-
proving a court’s understanding. If language is improved to the point 
that a court is willing to find it unambiguous to consumers, it will 
automatically be unambiguous to the court. Note the reverse is not 
true. As discussed below, a court may find language to be confusing 
to laypeople even though the court has a good idea what it means. 
 For now, let us accept that for this subset of contra proferentem 
responses, the rule could very well be efficient. It is useful to start 
with this assumption because the costs of the next two responses are 
high enough to credibly overwhelm the benefits of the redraft re-
sponse. Thus, not much turns on whether this subset is efficient, and 
its efficiency is plausible enough to warrant respect. To be clear, 
                                                                                                                       
 129. One of the best pieces detailing state insurance regulation was written in 1999, 
but the structure for most states does not seem to have changed dramatically. See Susan 
Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999). 
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however, the value of the benefits from redrafting do hinge on (1) the 
rule being applied to real gaps, not manufactured ambiguity, and  
(2) the redrafted language being unambiguous. In the end, whether 
contra proferentem is efficient overall hinges on whether the value of 
the beneficial subset of cases outweighs the costs of the detrimental 
subset of cases. 
(b)   When Insurers Do Nothing  
 Does contra proferentem operate efficiently when it elicits no re-
sponse? Where the clause is not redrafted, the judicially enforced 
clause is at odds with one plausible reading of the contract text.130
Policyholders who read a written exclusion as the insurer intended 
will conclude they have no coverage, unaware that courts have read 
the clause in policyholders’ favor.131 Or they will see gibberish in lieu of 
the court’s “provide coverage” substitute term.132 Contra proferentem, 
in these cases, increases the information asymmetry the doctrine is 
meant to combat. 
 Insurers can be blamed for this mess, one could say. If only they 
would respond properly to the incentive to avoid the penalty default 
by clarifying the contract language, the incentive would work as in-
tended. But this amounts to saying the penalty would work if only it 
would work. To determine if contra proferentem is efficient we must 
take the incentives it produces as they come and not as we wish them  
to be.
 There is enough blame to go around. Contra proferentem would be 
more efficient if courts’ instructions to insurers were concrete. The 
default rule is “provide coverage,” and the way around future appli-
cation of the rule is “redraft.” If it “would have been easy” for the  
insurer to have drafted a clause to avoid its default-coverage fate, as 
many courts state,133 then it should be easy for the court to recom-
mend language it would find clear and enforceable.134 Thus, one  
inefficiency of contra proferentem is that it sends the signal to con-
tract around the default without being clear about how to do so. This 
weakens the incentive to attempt to contract around the default 
when doing so is costly but success is uncertain. Repeated failures, or 
                                                                                                                       
 130. See Boardman, supra note 38, at 1123-24.  
 131. See id. at 1115.  
 132. See id. at 1117. 
 133. See, e.g., Smith v. Am. States Ins. Co., 586 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“American States easily could have drafted its policy to preclude Smith's recovery in this 
case.”); Neal-Pettit v. Lahman, 8th Dist. No. CV-545838, 2008-Ohio-6653, at ¶ 4 (“Had 
Allstate intended otherwise, the policy language could easily have been drafted to reflect 
that intention.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 683 N.W.2d 75, 90 (Wis. 
2004) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“While State Farm could have very easily drafted its policy 
language differently so as to preclude [the plaintiff’s] claim . . . it chose not to do so.”).  
 134. For a similar “safeharbor[]” suggestion, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 123.  
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the failure of other insurers to succeed in redrafting, also fuel the 
view that perhaps the sub-rule for particular clauses is actually a 
mandatory substantive rule.135  The costs and benefits of the non-
response are not quite the mirror opposite of the redraft response. 
There are still costs on the insurer. Retaining language that some 
courts will construe in favor of coverage may require the insurer to 
take the cost of that coverage into premium calculation. If the insurer 
plans to continue denying coverage, and litigating larger claims, the 
cost of that increased litigation also gets folded in. Judicial costs will 
also increase; the promise of a positive outcome under contra 
proferentem will lure more policyholders to sue for coverage, if they 
have lawyers to tell them of the promise.  
 This raises the one benefit under the non-response subset: the 
lone policyholder or the few who sue and take the case to court judg-
ment are awarded coverage. This is a certain benefit to that litigant. 
It carries with it the cost of failed contra proferentem to all other 
consumers—the gap between the written contract and the enforced 
contract plus an increase in premium. Even assuming the benefit to 
the few in court is much greater to them than the cost to out-of-court 
consumers, the sheer numbers of the latter make it difficult to defend 
this subset as providing a net benefit.  
(c)   When Insurers Accept the Default Rule 
 Does contra proferentem operate efficiently under the acceptance 
response? The cost to insurers and state insurance commissioners 
should be similar to those under the redraft response. In both cases, 
the insurers redraft and the regulatory officials review the new 
clause. The burden could easily be lower under the acceptance re-
sponse, however, because it may be the simple removal of an exclu-
sion and not an elaborate group endeavor to re-write a clause.  
 Note that the benefit to the litigating consumer who wins coverage 
through contra proferentem is the same across all three responses. 
That is because this benefit does not depend in any way on the insurer’s 
ex post response. The benefit is a direct outcome of the court’s actions 
and it accrues immediately. Unfortunately, the number of consumers 
to whom this benefit accrues is tiny. Most policyholders do not sue, 
and most who do sue settle out of court.136
 The outcome for the bulk of consumers from the acceptance re-
sponse is markedly different from the two other possible responses. If 
the newly expanded coverage is what consumers have wanted all 
along, the courts have successfully pushed insurers to sell more of 
their product; everyone wins. But if the newly expanded coverage is 
                                                                                                                       
 135. See Stempel, supra note 47, at 206. 
 136. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990).  
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not what most consumers want, it becomes an inescapable burden of 
boilerplate. Which is it? 
 We might think that because a policyholder in court is seeking 
coverage, this represents the desires of his fellows. But contra 
proferentem fills the gap with what this policyholder prefers at this
moment, not with what this policyholder would have wanted ex ante
or with what other policyholders want ex post. A policyholder after a 
loss may pursue his individual compensation over a healthy, efficient 
insurance market. Insurers can represent the interest of the many 
policyholders against the few (or the future policyholders against the 
demands of the present).137 If insurers are wrong about what con-
sumers want, the expanded coverage expands social gain. 
 The compelling penalty default story for contra proferentem in 
insurance thus requires a systemic market failure in consumer insur-
ance. The acceptance response is beneficial only if most consumers 
wanted the new coverage, and were willing to pay for it, but insurers 
had foolishly refused to sell it. This must happen at times: either 
market demand changes over time or insurers realize they missed a 
market opportunity. But a key question is whether the court’s appli-
cation of contra proferentem to ambiguous language would just hap-
pen to coincide with this market failure.  
 To see why a market failure is required, consider the alternatives. 
If insurers are not selling a form of coverage because most consumers 
do not want it, then the contra proferentem-triggered expansion of 
coverage harms consumers. The rule forces consumers to buy some-
thing they do not want. The acceptance response is only useful to 
consumers if the default is majoritarian as to policyholders, which is 
to say that most want to buy the coverage. But if most want to buy 
the coverage, we would ordinarily expect insurers to already be sell-
ing it. The contra proferentem plus acceptance response only adds 
value if most consumers want the coverage but it somehow is not  
being sold.  
 Market failures happen; they must happen in the consumer in-
surance market on occasion.138 The question is whether courts are in 
a good position to identify a failure, especially if (1) they are con-
strained to remedy only those market failures that are accompanied 
by ambiguous policy language; and (2) identifying and correcting a 
                                                                                                                       
 137. First, insurance looks at groups, at the socialization of risk through standard 
standard contracts sold to large numbers of similarly situated persons who 
face an uncertain risk. What is good for the group, as a whole, in face of un-
certainty, may not be what is good for any individual when sued.  
Kent D. Syverud, What Professional Responsibility Scholars Should Know About Insurance, 4 
CONN. INS. L.J. 17, 19 (1997). 
 138. For an excellent critique of the potential for market failure in insurance, see Rap-
paport, supra note 69, at 237-49. 
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market failure is not the task at hand. If we wish to empower courts 
to correct this type of market failure, we should adopt a rule granting 
courts the power to do so and to gather the necessary evidence. Contra 
proferentem does not make this attempt.  
 As it stands, courts do not seem troubled by questions of insurance 
market failure. Courts generally theorize that insurers value exclu-
sions and policyholders do not. Policyholders prefer to be paid for 
losses, dislike exclusions, and would rather have more coverage than 
less, the assumption goes. This is true for one class of exclusions—those 
exclusions for which policyholders are willing to pay. If coverage were 
free, all policyholders would dislike all exclusions. Until that day, all 
policyholders value some exclusions. Courts seem to assume the con-
trary at times. 
 The acceptance response subset thus takes what is meant to be a 
temporary judgment about ambiguity and turns it into a long-lived 
“judgment” about the market desirability of a contract term. Where 
the application happens to coincide with a market failure, the rule 
may be momentarily efficient. In all other cases, it fails to produce 
information to the consumer while forcing the consumer to pay for 
more coverage than he wants.  
 Finally, is contra proferentem efficient over all, taking the two re-
sponses and one non-response into account? A definitive answer re-
quires empirical proof about the percentage and value of the cases 
that fall within each subset response. Scholars and litigators may 
differ on this, but my own take is that the value of the expected re-
draft response may be overwhelmed by the non-response and the ac-
ceptance response. For purposes of calculating social benefit, the non-
response category includes the years, sometimes decades, during 
which a clause is not redrafted, even if it is eventually changed, then 
falling into either redraft or acceptance.  
 The contribution of this analysis is not to definitively conclude 
that insurance contra proferentem is empirically inefficient. What 
the analysis does show is that contra proferentem produces many 
costs, including substantial unexpected costs such as pockets of in-
creased asymmetry between consumers and insurers. Efficiency of 
the penalty default will turn in part on whether the aggregate 
asymmetry is increased or decreased.139 That contra proferentem 
turns on itself is a point I have made elsewhere, but the penalty de-
fault rule framework provides a fresh way to weigh the costs.140 With 
the pitfalls revealed, let the debate begin.  
                                                                                                                       
 139. It turns on other factors too, such as the cost to insurers of redrafting, sometimes 
without any effect on judicial outcomes.  
 140. See Boardman, supra note 38, at 1117-20. 
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2.   Are Penalty Defaults More Desirable in Non-Insurance  
Consumer Contracts? 
 A relevant measure of whether a default rule is efficient is if it 
produces “whatever term . . . would have maximized the ex ante value 
of the contract to the two parties, independent of any effect on third 
parties.”141 One flaw of insurance contra proferentem in particular is 
that it has substantial third-party effects. Where the penalty is ap-
plied repeatedly but ineffectively, policyholders end up buying more 
than the market dictates. Contra proferentem says “coverage,” and so 
coverage is extended and paid for. Admittedly, this is another way of 
objecting to a penalty default that penalizes but fails to force infor-
mation—a rule that does not give the parties what they would have 
contracted for in pursuit of a lost cause. But because identical insur-
ance clauses apply to so many parties simultaneously, the harm of an 
anti-majoritarian rule is widespread.  
 How much better does non-insurance contra proferentem fare? In 
the consumer context, the results are mixed. The primary difference 
for a large portion of non-financial consumer contracts is that the 
contract is less central to the product being sold and purchased.142
The contract is largely the product in insurance, not so for many con-
sumer purchases or services.143 Changing the contract through the 
acceptance response should have a smaller change, in the aggregate, 
on the product consumers want to buy. Of course, key terms may al-
ready be limited by consumer protection laws, the U.C.C., and man-
datory default rules. 
 On the other hand, one may be similarly skeptical about whether 
the rule has any effect on the contract reading habits of unengaged 
consumers. This skepticism should apply to any penalty default rule, 
contra proferentem or not, aimed at encouraging a commercial party 
to convey more information to consumers. The threat of negative ex-
ternalities can also still arise; consumer boilerplate terms apply to a 
multitude of consumers simultaneously, as in insurance, if the draft-
er is a major seller or service provider. Even so, the effect of the rule 
is likely to be smaller outside of insurance because it is applied infre-
quently in the non-insurance context.   
IV.   IMAGINING ANOTHER FORM OF CONTRA PROFERENTEM 
 Gaps in insurance contracts cannot be avoided. Short of courts re-
turning to an era of contract non-enforcement as a penalty, courts 
must have default terms at the ready. It would be hard to stomach 
non-enforcement of the insurance contract, which would leave the 
                                                                                                                       
 141. See Posner, supra note 2, at 569 n.9 (emphasis added). 
 142. See Boardman, supra note 22, at 1081. 
 143. See id.
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policyholder permanently uncompensated for his loss.144 This leaves 
the choice between majoritarian and non-majoritarian defaults—either 
minoritarian or penalty defaults. The choice can turn on the cause of 
the contract gap.145 Ayres and Gertner name two sources of incom-
pleteness: the cost of contracting and strategic incompleteness.146
 If the gap is due to the contracting cost of filling in the term, 
courts may want to hand parties the term they would have chosen 
had the costs been lower—a majoritarian default.147 If the gap is due 
to a strategic choice by one of the parties, courts may adopt an infor-
mation-forcing default—a penalty default.148
 Although not asking explicitly whether the default should be a 
penalty, courts often attempt to determine the cause of the gap. Per-
haps this causes some of the inconsistencies and inefficiencies in in-
surance default rules; courts are unsure or disagree about why the 
gaps—the ambiguities—exist. Are insurers acting strategically by 
writing intentionally obtuse language? Are they simply being sloppy? 
Did they try to draft well but then fail to see an emerging risk that it 
was their role to identify and handle?149
A.   As a Penalty Default Aimed at Informing Courts 
 Some version of a penalty default rule might make sense if insur-
ers are strategically withholding information to increase their gains 
from the contract. They have some incentive to do so in the consumer 
context. The insurer knows it excludes a particular loss, say from 
flood or mold. It also knows that a prospective buyer would dislike 
                                                                                                                       
 144. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 89-97 (2003) (discussing  
disproportionate forfeiture). 
 145. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 127. The choice between types of defaults also 
turns on the costs of contracting around the default, the costs of failing to contract around 
the default, and if the rule is to be majoritarian, whether the majority or minority will 
more likely contract around the default. See id. at 127-28; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 
729, 735-36 (1992) (noting penalty default “serves as counterexample to those who would 
argue that default rules should simply replicate the contracts that a majority of parties 
would make in the absence of transaction costs”). 
 146. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 92-94.  
 147. Id. at 93. 
 148. Id. at 94 (“One party might strategically withhold information that would increase 
the total gains from contracting (the ‘size of the pie’) in order to increase her private share 
of the gains from contracting (her ‘share of the pie’).”). Ayres and Gertner argue that where 
the point is to provide information to courts, the efficient default is likely non-enforcement, 
which they argue gives both parties an incentive to inform. See id. at 97. Where the point is 
to force the more informed party to inform the lesser, the likely default is a one-sided de-
fault that harms the information holder. See id. At least in theory, contra proferentem fits 
this second model.  
 149. See generally Hall, supra note 39 (discussing the potential for coverage of Y2K 
claims, specifically under “sue and labor” and similar policy provisions); supra note 26 and ac-
companying text (discussing damage to tangible property and computer data); supra note 31 
and accompanying text (discussing the “sudden and accidental” addition to pollution exclusions). 
2013] PENALTY DEFAULT RULES 343
the exclusion if she were aware of it. The insurer further knows, 
however, that other insurers exclude these same losses such that, 
like it or not, the buyer will end up with a policy that does not cover  
the loss.  
 What does the insurer gain from bringing the exclusion to the at-
tention of the buyer? Nothing is gained if the additional coverage is 
not offered for an additional price. The sale may be lost, however, if 
the buyer goes elsewhere in response. Even if the next insurer re-
veals its identical exclusion, many buyers may just complete the se-
cond purchase, having learned they cannot escape the exclusion, ra-
ther than return to the first insurer.  
 Nonetheless, a default rule providing coverage unless the insurer 
brings the exclusion to the buyer’s attention is unworkable. Policies 
contain dozens, if not hundreds, of exclusions. A cover document that 
attempted to list, in bold and large font, all of these exclusions would 
overload the buyer’s senses and remain unread, like the contract itself.150
 Even in the face of known strategic behavior, contra proferentem 
fails in its current form because insurers focus on courts. (Courts fo-
cus in turn on consumers, creating an unrequited love triangle.) “No 
other enterprise, to the extent of the insurance industry, collects ju-
dicial data (court decisions) and uses them to draft standardized lan-
guage for industry contracts.”151 The court is the insurers’ drafting 
audience, however unwilling it may be. 
 Two of the reasons to doubt the value of contra proferentem as an 
information-forcing default stem from its focus on consumers as the 
receivers of the information. First, there is reason to doubt that in-
centing clearer language, in insurance contracts in particular, will 
necessarily lead to consumers reading more contract language. Se-
cond, one reason insurers take the inefficient acceptance response or 
non-response is that they doubt the courts will accept their attempts 
to clarify an exclusion.  
 Both of these problems would be solved by changing the rule’s fo-
cus to courts. If language is redrafted in response to the operation of 
contra proferentem, and litigation continues, there is no question 
that judges will read the redrafted clause. And if the aim of the rule 
is to make the language accessible to courts, that can readily be ac-
complished by the court recommending improved language.  
The court-focused penalty default rule would command: If the 
judge finds the contract ambiguous, the gap should be filled contra 
                                                                                                                       
 150. Perhaps this is where the reasonable expectations principle comes in. Only those 
exclusions that violate the buyer’s reasonable pre-purchase assumptions need be highlight-
ed. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 151. James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Inter-
pretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 995-96 (1992).  
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proferentem to the advantage of the consumer. The command to 
the insurer is then to redraft language the court can understand. 
To avoid application of the rule in the first place, the insurer is to 
draft with the court in mind. 
This is a radical proposal. It fits partially into the existing categories 
of default rules because Ayres and Gertner envisioned the option of 
an information-forcing rule aimed at giving courts more infor-
mation.152 This option, however, assumes two knowing contracting 
parties revealing more information to the courts. It does not include 
keeping one party relatively ill-informed.153
 The Ayres and Gertner model for a default aimed at providing in-
formation to the courts operated by the default of non-enforcement of 
the contract. In the original model, non-enforcement as a penalty de-
fault is meant to give both parties an incentive to provide infor-
mation to the courts.154 The zero-quantity default under the U.C.C. is 
a prime example.155 If the parties bother to go through the act of con-
tracting, both believe the contract to be in their interest. Therefore, if 
they understand that a blank quantity term will render the contract 
unenforceable, they will come to a written agreement about quantity, 
saving the court the hassle. The common law rule against enforcing 
contracts that are too indefinite is another example.156
 These two examples reveal the usual court-focused structure: both 
parties are aware that failing to choose a quantity or give much de-
tail to a contract might keep it from being a contract at all, and both 
parties are encouraged by the threat of the penalty default to provide 
more detail to the court. The proposal here—call it contra 
proferentem ad judex—continues to be a unilateral default as op-
posed to incenting both parties. The wisdom of this proposal will re-
quire its own piece. For now, imagining the benefits of a clear lan-
guage command that can truly be fulfilled by both the sender and the 
receiver of information provides a stark contrast to contra 
proferentem’s anemic effort. 
                                                                                                                       
 152. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 97. 
 153. See id. at 98. 
 154. See id. at 97-98. 
 155. The zero-quantity default under the U.C.C states that courts will not determine a 
“reasonable quantity” of a good sold if the contract does not specify, although the Code will 
fill a price gap with a court’s determination of a “reasonable price.” See U.C.C. §§ 2-201(1), 
2-305(1) (2012). Ayres and Gertner argue that the quantity default makes sense as a pen-
alty because it will cost more for courts to determine a reasonable quantity ex post than for 
parties to determine one ex ante. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 96. We might won-
der if the same is true with a price term, but it is certainly cheaper for the court to deter-
mine a “reasonable,” i.e. market, price than a reasonable quantity. See id.
 156. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 97 (using as an example “the common law's 
broader rule that ‘for a contract to be binding the terms of the contract must be reasonably 
certain and definite’ ” (quoting Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch., 354 N.E.2d 586, 589 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1976))); id. at 106 (discussing Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 
689 (Minn. 1957)). 
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B.   As a Majoritarian Default  
 Can the cost of accurately and unambiguously conveying coverage 
information to consumers ever be worth incurring?157 If those costs 
are too steep, a majoritarian default makes more sense. Even if we do 
not have high hopes that it will ever be rational for consumers to 
read their insurance policies well, and we do not think the average 
consumer well-informed enough about risks to make minute deci-
sions about the value of coverage for costly but improbable events,  
we prefer courts to grant consumers the product they demand. The  
current operation of contra proferentem is overly generous in cover-
age, but in the end, that generosity is paid for with the consumers’  
own money.  
 In an article focusing on the consent implications of default rules, 
Randy Barnett argues that where “only one party can be counted on 
to know the law, the law should adopt a conventionalist default rule 
reflecting the commonsense understanding of the community to 
which the rationally ignorant party belongs.”158 A “conventionalist 
default” is one that reflects the conventional understanding of the 
relevant community.159 Here, the knowledgeable party is the insurer 
(or seller), and the rationally ignorant party is the consumer. If the 
informed party dislikes the consumer’s “commonsense understand-
ing,” it will “explicitly contract around the default rule, and . . . call 
the new rule to the attention of the rationally ignorant party.”160
 This provides for a vision of a new form of contra proferentem; 
although it is perhaps a new rule altogether—pro lectore—in favor of 
the reader. The collective readers, consumers, have in some instances 
a conventional understanding about coverage. The insurer remains 
free to break with that understanding as this remains a default, not a 
mandatory rule. But if the language on point is ambiguous, the de-
fault reverts to the conventional understanding.  
 Pro lectore would have a more limited application than contra 
proferentem. For example, there has been a fight over whether the 
innocent spouse of an arsonist should be compensated for his or her 
home loss through their joint homeowners insurance, even though 
the loss was intentionally caused by one holder of the insurance poli-
cy.161 There probably is a conventional understanding in the relevant 
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community (homeowners) about whether the spouse should take; if 
my insurance students are representative, the conventional default 
would be that the innocent spouse is compensated. But pro lectore is 
limited because there are many instances where the community 
might have no conventional understanding. Contra proferentem al-
ways has an answer, which is part of the problem. Pro lectore would 
not always have an answer, creating a different problem.  
 Note that this doctrine is a little more complex than the conven-
tional understanding of “majoritarian.” Easterbrook and Fischel 
choose “the term that the parties would have selected with full in-
formation and costless contracting.”162 (What terms would a policy-
holder select with full information, including information about the 
cost of the term and the likelihood of loss?) This seems to lean toward 
a Socratic ideal form of term selection compared to an earlier descrip-
tion by Easterbrook and Fischel in which “[t]he gap-filling rule will 
call on courts to duplicate the terms the parties would have selected, 
in their joint interest, if they had contracted explicitly.”163 Similarly, 
Richard Posner advocates “supplying standard contract terms that 
the parties would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement.”164
 Pro lectore is not about express agreement. By design it follows 
the Barnettian conventionalist default.165 The rule remains majori-
tarian because it assumes that insurers accept the conventional con-
sumer understanding unless they, the insurer, explicitly reject it. 
This places a burden on the insurer of allowing the consumer to  
be the “first mover,” but this burden is a natural one with or without  
the rule.  
 This returns us to the very beginning by raising the possibility 
that contra proferentem is already a majoritarian rule. Perhaps the 
default in insurance is coverage because shifting risk from the poli-
cyholder to the insurer is the function of the contract. As the Su-
preme Court of Indiana writes, “An ambiguous insurance policy 
should be construed to further the policy’s basic purpose of indemni-
ty.”166 As Judge Richard Posner has mused, the “precept [of constru-
ing ambiguities against the drafter] seems related to the fact that the 
purpose of an insurance contract is to shift risk from the insured to 
the insurer.”167
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 Thus, the nature of the contract and the buyer’s purpose for buy-
ing the contract suggest that rules like contra proferentem operate as 
majoritarian defaults. While insurers may dislike individual out-
comes under contra proferentem when the insurer disagrees with the 
court that a clause is ambiguous as applied, the general application 
of the doctrine is a majoritarian insurer preference because (1) the 
insurer accepts its role as default risk bearer, and (2) the industry 
needs to convince wary consumers to purchase a policy they do not 
understand. “A natural solution to this problem is to agree that am-
biguities will be construed against the drafter.”168
 But if the contra proferentem treatment of ambiguity is an insurer 
preference, it could easily be put into insurance contracts itself; why 
should it be a default? Judges might laugh at a pro proferentem
clause and object to being told how to perform their duties, but a con-
tra proferentem clause would be readily enforced. The absence of a 
contra proferentem clause cannot be blamed on contracting costs or 
unexpected circumstances. The “missing” contra proferentem clause 
is not in the class of inevitable gaps that all types of contracts will 
have, including those caused by unforeseen ambiguity.  
 The extreme care and precision, some say extreme precision,169
with which insurance contracts are drafted obviates the need for 
sweeping or general majoritarian defaults in insurance.170 Courts 
could apply the default rule of pro lectore in a majoritarian manner, 
but either pro lectore or contra proferentem will have to be imposed 
on insurers. In short, as with contra proferentem, the pro lectore doc-
trine would be mandatory, but the substantive rule reached in indi-
vidual cases would be a default the insurer could avoid by drafting.  
V. CONCLUSION
 The doctrine of contra proferentem is a penalty default rule. Thus, 
at least one penalty default rule exists. As it operates in insurance, 
the rule creates a default mechanism for filling contractual gaps with 
a context-specific form of “provide coverage.” Unfortunately, there is 
reason to doubt that the rule is effective at forcing insurers to convey, 
or policyholders to accept, additional information. Policyholders are 
partially ignorant of the details of their insurance contracts; rational 
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ignorance or no, this limits the benefit of improving contract lan-
guage. More importantly, when insurers do not redraft in response to 
the penalty, the two alternative responses can make consumers  
worse off. 
 When insurers retain ambiguous language in the face of court ap-
plication of contra proferentem, the gap between the consumers’ un-
derstanding of the language and its “legal” meaning, as applied by 
courts, widens. Ambiguous language is not improved, but consumers 
are worse off. When insurers “accept” an application of contra 
proferentem by adding coverage to the insurance policy, consumers 
are only better off if both the ambiguous language and the court ap-
plication of contra proferentem happen to coincide with a market 
failure in the supply of insurance. That is, only where insurers’ fail-
ure to provide coverage, despite consumer desire and willingness to 
pay for it, coincides with a court finding language ambiguous to con-
sumers does consumer welfare increase. If these two circumstances 
do not align, the insurers’ “accept” response causes policyholders to 
pay for undesired coverage.  
 This Article cannot conclude definitively that contra proferentem 
is inefficient. It is not likely, however, that the value to consumers of 
improved language in those cases where insurers do redraft out-
weighs the cost to consumers from the cases where insurers do noth-
ing or add coverage. Thus, while contra proferentem is a penalty de-
fault, there is cause to think it should not be.   
